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The Double-Edged Sword of Health Care Integration: 
Consolidation and Cost Control* 
ERIN C. FUSE BROWN AND JAIME S. KING† 
The average family of four in the United States spends $25,826 per year on health 
care. American health care costs so much because we both overuse and overpay 
for health care goods and services. The Affordable Care Act’s cost control policies 
focus on curbing overutilization by encouraging health care providers to integrate 
to promote efficiency and eliminate waste, but the cost control policies largely 
ignore prices. This article examines this overlooked half of health care cost control 
policy: rising prices and the policy levers held by the states to address them. We 
challenge the conventional wisdom that reducing overutilization through health 
care integration will effectively reduce health spending. We argue that vertical 
integration—bringing together disparate providers from hospitals to physicians—is 
a double-edged sword, with not only the potential to reduce wasteful and 
unnecessary use of services but also downside risks of increasing market 
consolidation and health care prices. Due to already highly concentrated health 
care markets and the limits of federal antitrust enforcement of vertical health care 
integration, states have both an opportunity and an obligation to supplement 
federal antitrust efforts to control rising health care prices stemming from health 
care integration. The way to manage the double-edged sword of health care 
integration is to require price and quality oversight to avoid harm to competition. 
We offer a menu of six policy initiatives for states to choose from, ranging from 
data collection to rate regulation. If we are to control our personal and national 
health care spending, states have a critical role to play in overseeing health care 
integration and private health care price increases.  
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INTRODUCTION 
It is no secret that U.S. health care costs are out of control. The United States 
has experienced a more than 400% increase in total annual health care expenditures 
since 1990,1 exceeding $3 trillion and representing 17.5% of gross domestic 
product (GDP) in 2014 alone.2 The average family of four spends $25,826 on 
health care per year, an amount that could buy the family a new Toyota Prius or 
Tacoma every year.3 Yet while we pay more per capita than any other nation for 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, 
NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURES, PER CAPITA AMOUNTS, PERCENT DISTRIBUTION, AND 
AVERAGE ANNUAL PERCENT CHANGE: UNITED STATES, SELECTED YEARS 1960–2013, tbl.102 
(2014), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/2014/102.pdf [https://perma.cc/G4T8-UR67]. 
 2. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURES 2014 
HIGHLIGHTS, https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports 
/NationalHealthExpendData/Downloads/highlights.pdf [https://perma.cc/V2NC-X226]. 
 3. CHRIS GIROD, SUE HART & SCOTT WELTZ, 2016 MILLIMAN MEDICAL INDEX 3 (May 
2016), http://us.milliman.com/uploadedFiles/insight/Periodicals/mmi/2016-milliman-
medical 
-index.pdf [https://perma.cc/7XYA-S834] (“[O]f the typical family of four’s $25,826 in total 
[health care] spending, . . . the employer pays 57% of costs, or $14,793, while the employee 
pays the other 43%: $6,717 in employee contributions through payroll deduction and $4,316 
in the form of out-of-pocket expenses incurred at time of service.”); see TOYOTA, 
http://www.toyota.com/#!/hybrids-ev [https://perma.cc/8RX2-6D5N] (listing the starting 
price for a 2016 Prius as $19,560) TOYOTA, http://www.toyota.com/#!/trucks 
[https://perma.cc/KL37-YC59] (listing the starting price for a 2017 Tacoma as $24,120).  
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health care, the health of American citizens does not reflect this additional 
spending.  
In the lead-up to the passage of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), Atul Gawande 
laid out what has become the dominant narrative of U.S. health care cost 
containment in his highly influential New Yorker article, The Cost Conundrum.4 
The narrative was this: Medicare health care expenditures vary widely throughout 
the country in ways that cannot be explained by the sickness of the patient 
population, the quality of care provided, or even the cost of producing the health 
care. The most expensive regions in the country have higher health care utilization, 
and for that extra utilization, they produce neither better quality care nor better 
patient health outcomes. In fact, leading researchers estimate that the federal 
government could eliminate nearly 30% of Medicare spending without sacrificing 
quality or outcomes if higher-spending regions mirrored the utilization patterns of 
lower-spending regions.5 Following this logic, Dr. Gawande and several leading 
health economists argued that to bend the cost curve, the U.S. health care system 
needed to realign its payment and delivery systems to disincentivize and reduce 
overutilization, and to instead reward coordination, quality, and efficiency.6 
Gawande’s account was so compelling that it became required reading in President 
Obama’s White House and Capitol Hill in the months leading up to the passage of 
the ACA, heavily influencing the translation of cost control policies into law.7  
As a result, the cost containment mechanisms of the ACA and other recent 
health care reform efforts focus heavily on reducing overutilization.8 To do so, 
federal policy incentivizes vertical integration among providers at different phases 
of health care delivery to improve care coordination, eliminate wasteful or 
                                                                                                                 
 
 4. Atul Gawande, The Cost Conundrum, NEW YORKER (June 1, 2009), http://www 
.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/06/01/the-cost-conundrum [https://perma.cc/5JHY-4WV4]. 
 5. Id.; see also John E. Wennberg, Elliot S. Fisher & Jonathan S. Skinner, Geography 
and the Debate over Medicare Reform, HEALTH AFF. W96, W104 (Feb. 13, 2002), 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/early/2002/02/13/hlthaff.w2.96.short [https://perma.cc 
/V5G6-DW2X].  
 6. See, e.g., Public Meeting of the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission 309, 380–
400 (Nov. 8, 2006), transcript available at http://www.medpac.gov/docs/default 
-source/meeting-materials/november-2006-meeting-transcript.pdf?sfvrsn=0 [https://perma.cc 
/BB5N-G57L] (describing the ACO model variously as “extended hospital medical staff” and 
“accountable organization”); David Cutler, How Health Care Reform Must Bend the Cost 
Curve, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1131 (2010); Elliot S. Fisher, Douglas O. Staiger, Julie P.W. Bynum 
& Daniel J. Gottlieb, Creating Accountable Care Organizations: The Extended Hospital 
Medical Staff, 26 HEALTH AFF. w44 (2007). 
 7. See Bob Kocher & Farzad Mostashari, Opinion, A Health Care Success Story, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 23, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/24/opinion/a-health-care-success 
-story.html [https://perma.cc/4CC4-4PLB]; Robert Pear, Health Care Spending Disparities 
Stir a Fight, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/09/us/politics 
/09health.html [https://perma.cc/BF7A-R6L7]. 
 8. Examples include the Medicare Shared Savings Program, 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj 
(2012); the Hospital Value-Based Purchasing Program, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395ww(o) (West 
2015); and the National Pilot Program on Payment Bundling, 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc-4 (2012).  
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repetitive services, encourage shared resources, and reduce overhead expenses.9 
Vertical integration in health care commonly occurs when a hospital purchases a 
physician practice, making the resulting entity responsible for both inpatient and 
outpatient care. Unfortunately, in this effort to control utilization, we have 
overlooked the other half of the cost control equation: prices.10  
 Health care cost containment efforts must consist of two parts: reducing 
overutilization and constraining health care prices.11 Just like going to the grocery 
store, the amount of your bill depends on how many items you buy as well as the 
price of each item. The United States will not bend the cost curve without 
addressing private health care prices.12 High prices are the main reason the United 
States spends so much more on health care than other wealthy, developed 
countries.13 Moreover, similar to the overutilization problem, the higher prices we 
pay do not result in more or better quality care nor do they lead to better health 
outcomes.14 While it may be true that nearly a third of Medicare spending is 
waste,15 when looking at our total public and private health care spending, price 
increases explain most of the rise in U.S. health care costs,16 eclipsing the effects of 
increasing utilization, the aging or sickness of the population, the supply of health 
care services, malpractice litigation, and defensive medicine.17  
                                                                                                                 
 
 9. See KAISER FAMILY FOUND., SUMMARY OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (2013), 
http://kff.org/health-reform/fact-sheet/summary-of-the-affordable-care-act [https://perma.cc 
/9UMJ-CUK2].  
 10. See Kevin Quealy & Margot Sanger-Katz, The Experts Were Wrong About the Best 
Places for Better and Cheaper Health Care, N.Y. TIMES: THE UPSHOT (Dec. 15, 2015), 
http:// 
www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/12/15/upshot/the-best-places-for-better-cheaper-health-care 
-arent-what-experts-thought.html [https://perma.cc/9XNR-CJRB] (quoting Robert Berenson, 
fellow at the Urban Institute, as saying “[p]rice has been ignored in public policy”). 
 11. Erin C. Fuse Brown, The Blind Spot in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act’s Cost-Control Policies, 163 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 871 (2015). 
 12. See Zack Cooper, Stuart Craig, Martin Gaynor & John Van Reenen, The Price Ain’t 
Right? Hospital Prices and Health Spending on the Privately Insured 2–3 (Dec. 2015) 
(unpublished manuscript), http://www.healthcarepricingproject.org/sites/default/files/pricing 
_variation_manuscript_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/3V7T-LL2X].  
 13. Gerard F. Anderson, Uwe E. Reinhardt, Peter S. Hussey & Varduhi Petrosyan, It's 
the Prices, Stupid: Why the United States Is So Different from Other Countries, 22 HEALTH 
AFF. 89, 103 (2003); Bruce C. Vladeck & Thomas Rice, Market Failure and the Failure of 
Discourse: Facing Up to the Power of Sellers, 28 HEALTH AFF. 1305, 1305–06 (2009). 
 14. See Vladeck & Rice, supra note 13, at 1306. 
 15. See Wennberg et al., supra note 5, at W104. 
 16. Gerard F. Anderson, Peter S. Hussey, Bianca K. Frogner & Hugh R. Waters, Health 
Spending in the United States and the Rest of the Industrialized World, 24 HEALTH AFF. 903, 
904 (2005); Hamilton Moses III, David H. M. Matheson, E. Ray Dorsey, Benjamin P. 
George, David Sadoff & Satoshi Yoshimura, The Anatomy of Health Care in the United 
States, 310 JAMA 1947, 1949 (2013). 
 17.  Anderson et al., supra note 16, at 904; Moses III et al., supra note 16, at 1949 (“Be-
tween 2000 and 2011, increase in price (particularly of drugs, medical devices, and hospital 
care), not intensity of service or demographic change, produced most of the increase in 
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In the United States, the health care pricing problem is largely a provider market 
power problem.18 Within the same geographic area, there can be a 60% difference 
between the highest- and lowest-priced hospitals for the same inpatient service, and 
a twofold difference in prices for outpatient services.19 A substantial body of 
research demonstrates that market power drives these unwarranted variations in 
price between providers, not differences in quality, payer mix, demographics, or 
health of the patient population.20 In other words, when we pay more at a high-price 
provider, we rarely receive more or better care; we simply pay more for its market 
leverage.21  
Unfortunately, the vertical integration used to target overutilization may also in-
crease provider market leverage.22 The primary vehicle for achieving vertical inte-
gration in the ACA is the Accountable Care Organization (ACO), a group of affili-
ated doctors, hospitals, and other health care providers that cooperate to provide 
                                                                                                                 
health’s share of GDP.”); OFFICE OF ATT’Y GEN. MARTHA COAKLEY, EXAMINATION OF 
HEALTH CARE COST TRENDS AND COST DRIVERS 3–4, 16–27, 35 (2010), 
http://www.mass.gov/ago/docs 
/healthcare/2010-hcctd-full.pdf [https://perma.cc/928G-3242] (“Price increases, not increases 
in utilization, caused most of the increases in health care costs during the past few years in 
Massachusetts.”). 
 18. See, e.g., PAUL B. GINSBURG, CTR. FOR STUDYING HEALTH SYS. CHANGE, RESEARCH 
BRIEF NO. 16, WIDE VARIATION IN HOSPITAL AND PHYSICIAN PAYMENT RATES EVIDENCE OF 
PROVIDER MARKET POWER 6 (2010), http://www.hschange.org/CONTENT/1162/1162.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/U2XN-HGAH]; CHAPIN WHITE, AMELIA M. BOND & JAMES D. 
RESCHOVSKY, CTR. FOR STUDYING HEALTH SYS. CHANGE, RESEARCH BRIEF NO. 27, HIGH AND 
VARYING PRICES FOR PRIVATELY INSURED PATIENTS UNDERSCORE HOSPITAL MARKET POWER 
2 (2013), http://www.hschange.com/CONTENT/1375/1375.pdf [https://perma.cc/987U-AVYX]; 
Robert A. Berenson, Paul G. Ginsburg, Jon B. Christianson & Tracy Yee, The Growing 
Power of Some Providers To Win Steep Payment Increases from Insurers Suggests Policy 
Remedies May Be Needed, 31 HEALTH AFF. 973, 973 (2012); Robert Berenson, 
Acknowledging the Elephant: Moving Market Power and Prices to the Center of Health 
Policy, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (June 3, 2014), 
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2014/06/03/acknowledging-the-elephant-moving 
-market-power-and-prices-to-the-center-of-health-policy/ [https://perma.cc/CC5X-4M9R]. 
 19. WHITE ET AL., supra note 18, at 2–4. 
 20. OFFICE OF ATT’Y GEN. MARTHA COAKLEY, supra note 17, at 2–4; Joseph P. 
Newhouse & Alan M. Garber, Geographic Variation in Health Care Spending in the United 
States: Insights from an Institute of Medicine Report, 310 JAMA 1227, 1227–28 (2013) 
(“[P]rice variation is responsible for an estimated 70% of the total geographic variation in 
spending among privately insured persons. Variation in wage levels and variation in the 
quantity of services delivered are almost equally responsible for the remaining estimated 
30% of spending variation.”); Cooper et al., supra note 12, at 3 (concluding that hospital 
market structure, that is, the degree of competition in the market, is strongly associated with 
hospital prices); GINSBURG, supra note 18, at 7.  
 21. OFFICE OF ATT’Y GEN. MARTHA COAKLEY, supra note 17, at 3–4; see GINSBURG, 
supra note 18, at 6.  
 22. Katherine Baicker & Helen Levy, Coordination Versus Competition in Health Care 
Reform, 369 NEW ENG. J. MED. 789, 789–91 (2013). 
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high-quality, coordinated care to a specific patient population.23 To form an ACO, 
provider organizations can integrate clinically, structurally, and/or financially. 
However, obtaining the desired clinical and financial integration can also open the 
door for health care provider organizations to vertically integrate in ways that 
further consolidate health care markets, increase provider market leverage, and 
raise prices. Despite all the hoped-for benefits from health care integration, there is 
no empirical evidence showing that the wave of integration is generating 
efficiencies or widespread savings. On the contrary, all the emerging literature on 
vertical integration between hospitals and physicians points in the same troubling 
direction: vertical integration is associated with increased prices and reduced 
consumer welfare.24 
This article examines the overlooked half of the narrative on health care cost 
control: rising prices and the policy levers held by the states to address them. 
Specifically, we challenge the conventional wisdom that policies directed at health 
care integration and utilization controls alone can meaningfully reduce health 
spending, and we consider the potentially harmful effects from increasing vertical 
integration between hospitals and provider organizations.25 We argue that 
unregulated vertical integration is a double-edged sword that poses significant risks 
to consumer welfare from increased health care prices. Due to already highly 
concentrated health care markets and the limits of federal antitrust enforcement of 
vertical health care integration, states have both an opportunity and an obligation to 
supplement federal antitrust efforts to control rising health care prices stemming 
from health care integration.  
The way to address the double-edged sword of vertical health care integration is 
to allow beneficial integration with a quid pro quo that the integrating entities must 
submit to oversight regarding price, quality, and competition. We offer six policy 
initiatives available to states in order of least to greatest amount of intervention into 
the state’s health care market: all-payer claims databases (APCDs); state antitrust 
enforcement or immunity; ACO certification programs; rate oversight authority; 
provider price caps; and rate regulation.26 
                                                                                                                 
 
 23. Accountable Care Organizations (ACO), CTRS. MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Jan. 
6, 2015, 2:58 PM), https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/ACO 
/index.html?redirect=/ACO/ [https://perma.cc/2JH4-FX2D].  
 24. A discussion of this literature is set forth infra Part II. 
 25. In this article, we focus specifically on vertical integration because antitrust authori-
ties have generally treated its use as procompetitive. As a result of this treatment, antitrust 
analysis and guidance for vertical integration efforts are much less robust than for horizontal 
consolidation among direct substitutes or competitors, such as mergers among hospitals.  
 26. States may also increase health care competition by implementing policies to elimi-
nate certificate-of-need laws that pose barriers to entry for new health facilities, loosening of 
scope-of-practice laws to allow different types of mid-level providers to compete with or 
augment the supply of physician services, or regulating provider-plan contracting practices 
to restrict anticompetitive use of most-favored-nation or anti-tiering clauses. We do not 
discuss these policies here because they mostly address threats to horizontal competition 
rather than describing ways states can oversee vertically integrated entities. For a good 
discussion of these options, see NAT’L ACAD. SOC. INS., ADDRESSING PRICING POWER IN 
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 Given the range of initiatives, legislators should vary their policy prescription 
based upon the particular market and political dynamics in the state. Three key in-
gredients, however, emerge as critical for effective state oversight of vertical inte-
gration and private price increases: (1) Information—states must have a means to 
collect and analyze price, quality, utilization, and market data, such as an all-payer 
claims database, in order to match their policy approach to their market and to eval-
uate their success; (2) Independence—state oversight bodies must be insulated 
from the powerful providers they oversee; and (3) Regulatory Authority—state 
oversight bodies must have the authority to enforce or impose limits on providers’ 
prices when they become too high.  
This Article explores the states’ critical role in addressing the double-edged 
sword of health care integration. Part I documents the rise of vertical health care 
integration driven by its theoretical benefits, as well as the legal incentives to 
integrate. Part II describes the emerging evidence that vertical integration in health 
care may also pose a threat to competition and lead to increased prices. Part III 
explains that states have a key role to play in managing this threat because of the 
limits of federal antitrust enforcement, federal oversight, and market-based 
solutions. Part IV posits that the way to manage the double-edged sword of vertical 
health care integration is to permit beneficial integration to proceed in exchange for 
price and quality oversight by states. Part IV goes on to examine an array of policy 
tools that all build upon robust all-payer claims data gathering to inform future 
health policy decisions.  
I. THE RISE OF HEALTH CARE INTEGRATION 
Health care in the United States is notoriously fragmented and inefficient.27 A 
popular policy view posits that increased vertical integration and collaboration in 
health care can reduce waste, increase efficiency, and improve quality by altering 
the financial incentives to overuse care and permitting physicians and other 
providers to more easily coordinate care.28 Accordingly, recent health care reforms 
have created powerful incentives for providers and even health plans to form 
vertically integrated systems, whether to operate an ACO or better manage the shift 
away from fee-for-service to new payment models based on value.29 But little is 
known about what conditions are required for health care integration to achieve 
these efficiencies or whether the benefits of integration outweigh the risks to 
competition and concentration of market power. Part I explores the theoretical 
                                                                                                                 
HEALTH CARE MARKETS: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY OPTIONS TO STRENGTHEN AND SHAPE 
MARKETS 29–37 (2015) [hereinafter NASI PANEL ON PRICING POWER], 
https://www.nasi.org/sites/default/files/research 
/Addressing_Pricing_Power_in_Health_Care_Markets.pdf [https://perma.cc/7ASE-W8YG]. 
 27. See, e.g., THE FRAGMENTATION OF U.S. HEALTH CARE: CAUSES AND SOLUTIONS 
(Einer Elhauge ed., 2010). 
 28. See Cutler, supra note 6, at 1133–34.  
 29. Similar incentives exist for horizontal consolidations between hospitals or between 
health insurers. Indeed, the pace of horizontal mergers in health care has also increased fol-
lowing the passage of the ACA. See Leemore Dafny, Hospital Industry Consolidation—Still 
More To Come?, 370 NEW ENG. J. MED. 198, 198 (2014).  
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promise of vertical health care integration and the incentives for integration 
contained in various legal reforms, including the ACA. 
A. Theoretical Benefits of Vertical Integration 
Unlike horizontal consolidation,30 vertical integration is theoretically ambigu-
ous—it may achieve increased efficiencies, but it may also serve to enhance market 
power.31 In microeconomics, vertical integration refers to the common ownership 
of two different stages of production of a product, such as manufacturing and 
distribution.32 In health care, vertical integration refers to the integration of 
suppliers of different components of health care services, such as hospitals and 
physicians, as well as integration of health systems and health plans, which 
collectively supply different elements of the health care product to the ultimate 
consumer.33 
According to neoclassical economic models, vertical integration enhances effi-
ciency by reducing transaction costs and arm’s-length contracting across separate 
organizations.34 In health care, vertical integration has similarly been thought to im-
prove efficiency through improved care coordination and reduction of 
fragmentation among providers and payers.35 Common ownership of hospitals and 
physician inputs in the health care “supply chain” can align financial incentives 
between hospitals and referring physicians, reduce duplicative or unnecessary care, 
provide centralized administrative services, and reduce transaction costs by 
                                                                                                                 
 
 30. The literature on the anticompetitive potential of horizontal consolidation among 
hospitals is clearer than for vertical integration. See, e.g., MARTIN GAYNOR & ROBERT TOWN, 
ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., THE IMPACT OF HOSPITAL CONSOLIDATION—UPDATE 
(2012), http://www.rwjf.org/content/dam/farm/reports/issue_briefs/2012/rwjf73261 [https:// 
perma.cc/JK6R-397T]. Our analysis, therefore, focuses on the “harder case” of vertical 
health care integration. See Thomas L. Greaney, Competition Policy After Health Care 
Reform: Mending Holes in Antitrust Law’s Protective Net, 40 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 
897, 897–98 (2015). 
 31. Martin Gaynor & Robert J. Town, Competition in Health Care Markets, in 2 
HANDBOOK OF HEALTH ECONOMICS 499, 620 (Mark V. Pauly, Thomas G. McGuire & Pedro 
Pita Barros eds., 2012). 
 32. See Austin B. Frakt, Steven D. Pizer & Roger Feldman, Plan-Provider Integration, 
Premiums, and Quality in the Medicare Advantage Market, 48 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 1996, 
1999 (2013). 
 33. Christopher Afendulis & Daniel Kessler, Vertical Integration and Optimal 
Reimbursement Policy 5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17316, 2011). 
 34. Laurence C. Baker, M. Kate Bundorf & Daniel P. Kessler, Vertical Integration: 
Hospital Ownership of Physician Practices Is Associated with Higher Prices and Spending, 
33 HEALTH AFFAIRS 756, 756–57 (2014); Gaynor & Town, supra note 31, at 619–20. 
 35. See, e.g., Baker et al., supra note 34, at 756–57; Lawton Robert Burns, Jeff C. 
Goldsmith & Aditi Sen, Horizontal and Vertical Integration of Physicians: A Tale of Two 
Tails, 15 ADVANCES HEALTH CARE MGMT. 39, 66–70 (2013); Stephen L. Walston, John R. 
Kimberly & Lawton R. Burns, Owned Vertical Integration and Health Care: Promise and 
Performance, 21 HEALTH CARE MGMT. REV. 83, 84–85 (1996). 
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allowing joint contracting with third-party payers.36 Vertical mergers of hospitals 
and physicians or health plans into integrated delivery systems may reduce the 
costs of complex negotiations between providers and payers. Between hospitals and 
physicians, arm’s-length contracts are costly to establish, whether due to health 
care fraud and abuse laws that limit hospital-physician contracts or payment 
systems that separate hospital and physician payments.37 As a result, vertical 
integration in health care has the potential to create significant efficiencies.  
B. Policy Incentives for Vertical Integration 
Based on these economic assumptions and the utilization-centered narrative of 
health care cost containment,38 the ACA offers numerous incentives to promote 
vertical integration in health care. The primary example is the Medicare Shared 
Savings Program, which encourages providers to form ACOs for Medicare 
beneficiaries, with the intent that private payers would adopt the model as well.39 
ACOs are groups of providers organized into a formal legal entity that agrees to be 
collectively accountable for the cost and quality of the health care for a defined 
population of individuals.40 The ACO structure rewards groups of providers for 
improving quality and care coordination while reducing unnecessary utilization by 
paying them a share of the amount they save for the payer.41 To the extent that an 
ACO assumes insurance risk, the providers within the ACO have an incentive to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 36. Afendulis & Kessler, supra note 33, at 5.  
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reduce the overall volume of services and reduce waste.42 Shared savings payments 
for ACOs further encourage hospitals and physicians to integrate to increase 
efficiency and reduce costs. Vertically integrated entities can more easily share 
data, eliminate redundancy, invest in interoperable health information technology, 
and implement clinical protocols that cross care settings. Further, vertical 
integration can make it easier to reduce “internal agency problems and take 
advantage of economies of scope.”43 
Other Medicare programs, such as bundled payments or value-based purchasing, 
also create incentives for fragmented providers to work together, coordinate care, 
and collectively internalize the costs of disparate aspects of an entire care episode. 
The payment bundling program pays providers a single lump-sum payment to 
cover all inpatient, physician, outpatient, and post-acute services involved in the 
episode of care.44 The ACA also implements significant payment cuts to hospitals 
according to measures of quality and value. These payment changes include 
Medicare rate cuts for excessive readmissions45 and hospital-acquired conditions,46 
and calculating Medicare bonuses or penalties based on measures of value.47 The 
upshot of all these Medicare payment reforms for providers is that they are 
assuming more financial risk and experiencing major changes to their business and 
revenue models, built on the old fee-for-service and diagnosis-based 
reimbursement methods.  
Providers may look to consolidation to maximize their ability to assume 
financial risk. Bigger systems have more enrollees, and ACOs need to be 
sufficiently large to be able to absorb financial risk and make the financial 
investments needed to achieve economies of scope necessary to generate cost 
savings on which ACO payments depend.48 Furthermore, the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) and Department of Justice (DOJ) have largely focused their 
antitrust policy guidance and review on horizontal provider consolidation, further 
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encouraging providers to integrate vertically.49 
In 2015, Congress passed the Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act 
(MACRA), which, among other things, repealed the formula that ties Medicare 
physician payments to a “sustainable growth rate” (SGR).50 MACRA adds to the 
momentum of provider consolidation by shifting more physicians to value-based 
and alternative payment models. Also known as the “doc fix,” MACRA replaced 
the widely unpopular SGR-based formula with a plan to implement Medicare 
physician fee bonuses based on participation in alternative payment models, such 
as ACOs.51 For physicians who do not participate in alternative payment models, 
MACRA adjusts their fee-for-service rates according to a merit-based incentive 
program that takes into account the physician’s quality measures, resource use, and 
adoption of electronic health records.52  
On top of the incentives already in the ACA, MACRA pushes more physicians 
to join ACOs. Even for physicians who stick with fee-for-service, the incentive-
based adjustments to their fees nudge physicians toward integration with larger 
systems due to the administrative burden and expense of implementing quality 
reporting, electronic health records, and resource use analysis. Together, the 
payment reforms of the ACA and MACRA are driving an upsurge of vertical health 
care integration. 
The ACA’s incentives extend beyond payment changes. The regulatory environ-
ment also favors clinical and financial integration among hospitals, physicians, and 
other types of providers (such as post-acute providers) by providing valuable 
waivers for onerous regulatory regimes like the Stark Law, Anti-Kickback Statute, 
and limited antitrust scrutiny to providers who implement a Medicare ACO or 
bundled payment pilot program.53 Provider liability under the Stark Law, 
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compounded with the False Claims Act’s treble damages, create an environment of 
extreme financial risk for hospitals, physicians, and other providers who seek to 
more closely align financial incentives and clinical processes. The greatest 
regulatory flexibility comes with forming a Medicare-approved ACO because then 
the ACO participants, and the payments made between them, are largely exempted 
from having to comply with the Stark Law and the Anti-Kickback Statute.54  
In addition, the antitrust review process for ACOs only applies to independent 
entities collaborating to form an ACO, which may also create an incentive for verti-
cally situated health care entities to merge into a unified delivery system prior to 
applying to participate in the Medicare Shared Savings Program, to ease the 
approval process. While the prior merger would be subject to FTC oversight and 
review, the FTC has challenged very few vertical mergers, and none among health 
care entities.55 Thus, if a hospital or physician group is contemplating forming a 
relationship to coordinate care, share referrals, and assume responsibility for the 
health and spending of a population of patients, there are strong regulatory 
incentives to merge or form a fully integrated ACO rather than adopting looser, 
contractual forms of alignment. These regulatory incentives are further enhanced 
by increases in market power and leverage that could arise from a merger or 
integration.  
Many of the desired benefits of clinical and financial integration, however, do 
not require health care entities to merge or formally integrate. Vertical integration 
can occur on several levels. The loosest form of vertical integration, the open 
contract form, would be a nonexclusive contractual relationship between a hospital 
and a group of physicians, such as the hospital’s medical staff or an independent 
practice association (IPA), in which the hospital provides some administrative 
support for health plan contracting and may engage in nominal care-coordination 
activities.56 An intermediate form of vertical integration, the closed contract form, 
would involve an exclusive contractual relationship between the hospital and a 
select group of physicians, in which the hospital provides higher levels of 
administrative and management services (e.g., electronic health records, billing, 
utilization and quality review, etc.), private health plan contracting, and care 
coordination.57 The tightest form of vertical integration is when the hospital owns 
the physician practices or directly employs the physicians.58 ACOs themselves can 
be organized along a spectrum from loose to tight integration between hospitals and 
physician-participants. While entities in these looser models can still engage in 
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significant clinical and financial integration (such as shared electronic medical 
records systems, payment incentives, and quality-of-care reporting mechanisms), 
tighter forms of integration may be encouraged by financial and regulatory 
incentives. 
Because of the promise of accountable care and the payment incentives through 
reform efforts, the pace of all types of vertical health care integration has increased. 
From 2004 to 2011, hospital ownership of physician practices, the tightest form of 
hospital-physician integration, increased from 24% to 49%.59 The Government 
Accountability Office reports that the number of vertically integrated physicians 
nearly doubled from 95,000 to 182,000 between 2007 and 2013.60 Although not all 
ACOs necessarily involve vertical integration of hospitals and physicians, most 
do.61 Following the passage of the ACA, the growth of ACOs has been rapid, with 
more than 700 ACOs established nationwide by 2015, about evenly split between 
Medicare and commercial ACOs.62 ACOs cover approximately 23.5 million 
individuals, and only about a third of this total (7.8 million) are Medicare 
enrollees.63 It is projected that a majority of Americans will receive their care from 
an ACO by 2018.64 
Some of the same trends driving health care provider integration are also 
contributing to an increase in plan-provider integrations. New payment models, like 
global payments, require provider organizations to assume more financial risk, 
which entails being responsible for the cost of care for an entire population of 
patients. Up to a point, the larger an organization is, the better it is able to assume 
population risk and invest in systems to meet quality targets. However, as it does, 
the provider network must assume more of the functions and capacity of health 
insurers. An ACO or a health system that is part of an ACO will be more likely to 
meet quality and cost- savings goals if it has the capacity to manage clinical, 
quality, and cost data and to take on financial risk, and one of the easiest ways for 
providers to acquire this capacity is to merge with a health plan.65 
From the payers’ perspective, health insurers are increasingly regulated under 
the ACA even while insurance market dynamics are changing. Many plans are 
either shifting more of the insurance/financial risk to providers (through ACOs and 
alternative payment systems) or leaving insurance risk with self-insured employers. 
Health plans are marketing their capacities for financial risk management, data 
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gathering and analysis, and care management to providers via management services 
contracts or consolidation into common entities.66 The ACA’s requirements, 
including medical-loss ratios,67 limits on underwriting activities,68 guaranteed 
issue,69 and the Cadillac Tax on costly employer-sponsored health plans70 are 
altering the business models of health plans and putting limits on the amount of 
profits the plans can earn from their premium revenue. As a result, health plans are 
looking for ways to increase their market share and shift their function to more of 
an administrative role, such as processing claims and gathering data on quality and 
cost. These trends are pushing more health plans to consider combinations with 
providers.  
Consequently, vertical integration between providers and health plans is rising. 
In one report from 2012, approximately 20% of hospital networks offered an 
integrated insurance plan, with another 20% contemplating doing so.71 Within the 
Medicare Advantage market, in which Medicare beneficiaries receive Medicare 
services through private managed care plans, about 17% of Medicare Advantage 
plans were integrated with providers in 2013.72 A 2015 poll of fifty-eight chief 
executive officers of health care providers and plans found that 88% predicted more 
plan-provider collaboration in the next three to five years.73 For instance, several 
hospital systems in California, other than Kaiser Permanente,74 have begun offering 
insurance through Covered California (California’s health care marketplace under 
the ACA).75  
Whether between hospitals and physicians or plans and providers, vertical inte-
gration in health care is on the rise. Providers are rapidly consolidating before we 
have a clear sense of what effect this integration will have on health care markets 
and prices. The early evidence is ominous. 
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II. THE DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD OF VERTICAL HEALTH CARE INTEGRATION 
Despite its many anticipated benefits, vertical health care integration presents a 
double-edged sword. The effort to promote beneficial integration has opened the 
door to health care consolidation across the country. Emerging empirical data 
reveals that vertical integration carries significant downside risks to competition 
and consumer welfare through increases in market power, increases in referrals and 
reimbursement rates, and reductions in consumer choice. Moreover, these studies 
have not found any evidence supporting the assumptions that vertical health care 
integration generates efficiencies or reduces costs.  
A. Increased Market Power 
Theoretical models suggest that vertical integration between hospitals and physi-
cians can harm competition by conferring greater market power on the merged 
entity. First, if at least one of the parties (either the hospital or physician group) has 
market power pre-merger, then a merger of the two can increase the aggregate 
market power of the merged entity vis-à-vis health plans.76 In 1999, Ester Gal-Or 
argued that the profitability of vertical hospital-physician mergers depended on the 
relative competitiveness between the hospital and physician markets.77 She 
reasoned that when the merging hospital and physician markets share similar levels 
of competitiveness, the merged entity can negotiate higher rates due to increased 
market power.78 The market power increase is strongest when both merging entities 
are in highly concentrated markets. By contrast, when the relative level of 
competitiveness differs significantly between the two markets, vertical mergers 
between physicians and hospitals may be unprofitable unless the merger includes a 
vertical restraint requiring exclusivity between the parties.79  
One way vertical integration increases the market share of the merged entity is 
through tying hospital and physician services together. Hospitals that acquire physi-
cian groups can effectively lock up the referral pool of physicians and bundle 
hospital and physician services together when negotiating with payers.80 This type 
of tying increases bargaining power of the merged provider-entity because in order 
for an insurer to include one provider in its network, it must also include other tied 
providers or services, often at elevated rates.81 In highly concentrated health-care 
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and health-insurance markets with significant barriers to entry, tying and refusal to 
supply can lead to rival exclusion.82 In its most extreme form, a vertically 
integrated entity will require “all or nothing” dealing, in which an insurer must 
either include all affiliated providers in its network or none at all.83 One way of 
achieving an “all or nothing” bargaining position is to enter into exclusive 
agreements between hospitals and physician groups, where the parties are unable to 
bargain with health plans outside of the tied entity.84 “All or nothing” dealing can 
lead to supracompetitive reimbursement rates across a wide range of providers in a 
particular provider organization. 
Another way vertical mergers can increase the merged entities’ market power is 
through foreclosure.85 Foreclosure occurs when “actual and potential competitors 
are disadvantaged due to restricted access to one of the most favorable providers,” 
making their costs higher for equivalent services and quality.86 The merger of a 
hospital with a physician group can foreclose rival hospitals from accessing the 
services of the integrated physicians, thereby increasing market power.87 In 
particular, competitors may lose patient volume needed to support their facilities 
because they cannot access the integrated physicians’ referrals.88  
Empirical evidence supporting theoretical hypotheses that vertical health care 
mergers can be used to increase market power and prices has begun to emerge.89 In 
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an earlier study, Alison Evans Cuellar and Paul Gertler similarly found that tighter 
forms of hospital-physician integration in the 1990s showed significantly higher 
prices and volume than stand-alone, unintegrated providers, supporting the theory 
that such vertical integrations are done to increase market power.90 But Federico 
Ciliberto and David Dranove found that vertical integration during the 1990s did 
not affect hospital prices.91 The opposite results in these two contemporaneous 
studies were seen as consistent with the theory that vertical integration can be both 
efficiency-enhancing and anticompetitive.92 There are differences between the mar-
ket conditions of the 1990s and today; one significant difference is that the hospital 
market is substantially more concentrated today, which may amplify the anti-
competitive effects of vertical integration between hospitals and physicians.93  
Indeed, more recent studies are starting to show that current forms of vertical in-
tegration can lead to higher prices. Laurence Baker, M. Kate Bundorf, and David 
Kessler examined vertical integration between 2001 and 2007 and found that the 
tightest form of vertical integration—hospital ownership of physician practices—
was associated with higher hospital prices, increased spending, and only modestly 
reduced utilization in the form of hospital admissions.94 To evaluate integration’s 
effects on physician prices, Cory Capps, David Dranove, and Christopher Ody 
looked at vertical mergers between 2007 and 2013 and found that physician prices 
increased nearly 14% following integration with hospitals.95 The price increase was 
not due to an increase in physician market power through horizontal mergers 
between physicians. Rather, the price increase corresponded to the hospital’s 
market share prior to integration—the larger the market share, the greater the price 
increase—which could be due to the hospital’s ability to charge facility fees for 
services previously provided on an outpatient basis or patients’ willingness to pay a 
premium for a plan with both a desired hospital and a preferred physician group.96  
James Robinson and Kelly Miller examined vertically integrated organizations 
in California between 2009 and 2012 and found that hospital ownership of 
physician organizations led to significantly higher total expenditures per patient 
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compared to physician-owned organizations.97 The expenditures were 10.3% higher 
for physician organizations owned by a local hospital, and 19.8% higher when the 
physician organization was owned by a multihospital system.98 The larger the 
market share of the vertically integrated hospital owner, the greater the 
expenditures. Notably, the study showed little or no evidence that vertical 
consolidation of hospitals and physicians resulted in increased efficiency.99 
Another study by Hannah Neprash, Michael Chernew, Andrew Hicks, Teresa 
Gibson, and Michael McWilliams found that markets with greater increases in 
hospital-physician integration between 2008 and 2012 experienced significantly 
greater increases in outpatient spending and prices.100 Because commercial price 
differences were greater than differences in Medicare prices, the authors concluded 
that the price increases associated with the hospital-physician integration resulted 
from enhanced market power of integrated providers, not just the site-of-service 
differential allowing higher prices for integrated physicians, discussed below.101 
Like Robinson and Miller’s, the study by Neprash et al. found that hospital-
physician integration was not associated with reduced utilization or improved 
efficiency from care coordination.102 
Empirical data on the effect of vertical integration between health plans and pro-
viders is even more limited than hospital-physician integration. In 2013, Austin 
Frakt, Steven Pizer, and Roger Feldman examined the impact of plan-provider inte-
gration on health care premiums and quality in the Medicare Advantage market.103 
The study revealed that plan-provider integration was associated with higher 
monthly premiums and also higher quality ratings than nonintegrated plans.104 
However, only 30% of the premium increase associated with integration was 
attributable to improvements in quality.105 Although some of the increased 
premiums could have been due to benefit enhancements, the authors did not 
observe a statistically significant increase in benefit generosity following 
integration for several benefits examined.106 The authors hypothesized that the 
increase in premiums also could have resulted from an increase in market power 
conferred on the plan from the integrated provider organization.107 While the Frakt 
                                                                                                                 
 
 97. Robinson & Miller, supra note 93, at 1668. In this study, expenditures were 
measured as the amounts insurers paid health care providers on a per-patient basis, excluding 
high-cost patients (incurring >$100,000 in health care expenses annually). Id. at 1665.  
 98. Id. at 1668. 
 99. See id. 
 100. Hannah T. Neprash, Michael E. Chernew, Andrew L. Hicks, Teresa Gibson & Mi-
chael McWilliams, Association of Financial Integration Between Physicians and Hospitals 
with Commercial Health Care Prices, 175 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1932, 1937 (2015). 
 101. Id. For discussion of the site-of-service differential, see infra Part II.B.  
 102. Neprash et al., supra note 100, at 1938.  
 103. See Frakt et al., supra note 32, at 1996. 
 104. Id. at 2008.  
 105. Id. at 2008–09.  
 106. Id. at 2009.  
 107. Id.  
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et al. study has several limitations related to its generalizability and conclusions,108 
it raises significant concerns regarding the ability of plans and providers to use 
vertical integration as a means to increase market power and leverage, warranting 
significantly more attention from health services researchers and antitrust enforcers.  
Overall, the emerging research on vertical integration has found that hospital 
ownership of physician organizations correlates with higher hospital prices, 
physician prices, prices for outpatient procedures, and per-patient expenditures. 
Furthermore, the only study on plan-provider integration also found an association 
between integration and higher premiums. These studies, and the dearth of any 
findings illustrating significant efficiencies or cost savings, lend support to the view 
that vertical integration in health care can be used to increase market power and 
prices. 
B. Increases in Referrals and Reimbursement 
Another anticompetitive effect of vertical integration is that acquisition of physi-
cian groups by hospitals may increase health spending from greater utilization and 
patient volume by allowing the hospital to pay for referrals within the bounds of 
health care self-referral laws.109 The federal Anti-Kickback Statute and the Stark 
Law both provide greater flexibility for hospitals to compensate employed, as 
opposed to contracted, physicians. For example, hospitals can pay employed 
physicians productivity bonuses for services personally performed by the 
physician, which would not be permitted for nonemployed physicians (i.e., 
independent contractors).110 Hospitals also can more readily require their employed 
physicians to refer patients to the hospital or to other integrated providers than they 
can require of independent physicians.111 Moreover, when the integrated entities 
                                                                                                                 
 
 108. Id. at 2009–10.  
 109. Afendulis & Kessler, supra note 33, at 6–7; Capps et al., supra note 89, at 1.  
 110. The Stark Law exception for bona fide employment relationships provides that enti-
ties (including hospitals) may pay employed physicians productivity bonuses for services 
personally performed by the physician. The exceptions for independently contracted 
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arrangements exceptions, do not permit productivity bonuses. 42 C.F.R. § 411.357(c) (2008) 
(bona fide employment relationships); 42 C.F.R. § 411.257(d) (personal services 
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furnishing of any item or service for which payment may be made in whole or in part under 
Medicare, Medicaid or other Federal health care programs.” 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(i).  
 111. See 42 C.F.R. § 411.354(d)(4) (2008) (setting forth the requirements for 
conditioning a physician’s compensation on referring to certain providers). Although 
hospitals may also require independent physicians to refer to the hospital in a personal 
services contract, the scope of the required referrals is limited to those services covered by 
the employment or personal services contract. 69 Fed. Reg. 16054, 16069–70 (Mar. 26, 
2004). Because of the limited nature of personal services agreements (e.g., call-coverage 
agreements, medical director agreements), the scope of services subject to required referrals 
is thus much broader for employed physicians than under most personal services agreements.  
74 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 92:55 
 
share fixed assets, it is easier for them to financially benefit from referrals within 
the integrated entity within the strictures of anti-referral and anti-kickback laws.112 
Hospitals, for example, are willing to acquire primary care physicians even if it is a 
money-losing proposition for the hospital because it allows the hospital to capture 
(and thus pay for) the primary-care physicians’ referrals for hospital services.113 
When explaining why hospital ownership of physician organizations led to higher 
total expenditures per patient, Robinson and Miller reasoned that higher 
expenditures could be driven by increased use of higher-priced services, but it could 
also be due to higher volume of services, or both.114 
A merger between hospitals and physicians may also allow the merged entity to 
charge higher prices for certain outpatient services by exploiting the fact that 
hospital-based services are typically reimbursed at higher rates than identical ser-
vices provided in physician-based locations.115 This pricing practice is called the 
site-of-service differential and is cited as one of the financial incentives driving 
hospital-physician integration.116 The site-of-service differential exists in Medicare 
reimbursement policy and is replicated in the commercial market.117 In Capps, 
Dranove, and Ody’s research finding that vertical integration between hospitals and 
physicians increased physician prices, they estimate that about a quarter of the 14% 
price increase resulted from exploitation of reimbursement methodologies that 
allow hospitals to charge facility fees for employed physicians.118 In the study by 
Neprash et al., the site-of-service differential explained part of the increase in prices 
for outpatient services experienced by those areas experiencing the highest increase 
in hospital-physician integration.119  
                                                                                                                 
 
 112. See Afendulis & Kessler, supra note 33, at 17.  
 113. ANN S. O’MALLEY, AMELIA M. BOND & ROBERT A. BERENSON., CTR. FOR STUDYING 
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 118. See Capps et al., supra note 89, at 4.  
 119. Neprash et al., supra note 100, at 1937 (concluding that the increase in outpatient 
prices was driven by both an increase in the integrated entity’s bargaining power and the 
higher prices driven by the site-of-service differential).  
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C. Agency Problems and Consumer Choice 
Hospital ownership of physician practices may exacerbate agency problems be-
tween physicians and patients. Agency problems arise between patients (the princi-
pals) and physicians (their agents) when physicians’ medical decisions on behalf of 
their patients are influenced by the physicians’ financial incentives and practice 
norms that may be at odds with the patients’ interests in obtaining the highest 
quality care at the lowest price.120 In the context of hospital services, the physician 
both orders and performs the hospital service, thus driving demand not only for the 
type of service but also for the particular facility at which the service will be 
performed.121  
Theoretically, it is unclear what effect vertical integration of hospitals and 
physicians may have on agency problems between physicians and patients. On the 
one hand, common ownership could align the financial incentives between 
hospitals and physicians, and thus improve care coordination and patient welfare.122 
However, hospital ownership of physicians could also create financial and other 
incentives for the physician to refer to the owner-hospital or to increase the volume 
or intensity of services ordered, rather than to choose the most cost-effective option 
for the patient.123  
In a study that examined the impact of hospital-physician integration on the pa-
tient’s choice of hospital, Laurence Baker, M. Kate Bundorf, and Daniel Kessler 
found empirical evidence that hospital ownership of physicians worsens the agency 
problem between physicians and patients.124 They found that “a hospital’s 
ownership of an admitting physician dramatically increases the probability that the 
physician’s patients will choose the owning hospital. . . . [P]atients are more likely 
to choose a high-cost, low-quality hospital when their admitting physician’s 
practice is owned by that hospital.”125 Although they were unable to determine 
whether, on net, the harms of vertical integration to patient welfare outweigh the 
potential benefits, the authors concluded that “hospital/physician integration affects 
patients’ hospital choices in a way that is inconsistent with their best interests.”126 
Even when providers have the right motives for integrating, when large 
conglomerates gain market power, they tend to use it to command higher prices. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 120. Thomas L. Greaney, Economic Regulation of Physicians: A Behavioral Economics 
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Taken together, the empirical picture of vertical integration in health care suggests 
some emerging themes: first, tighter forms of integration (e.g., acquisition versus 
contractual affiliation) are associated with greater increases in prices; second, the 
greater the market share of the hospital entity prior to consolidation, the more likely 
the merger will have anticompetitive effects; and third, the harms to consumer 
welfare go beyond higher prices and include incentives to refer patients to lower-
value facilities or higher-cost settings. In addition, there is a noted absence of 
empirical data illustrating that vertically integrated health care systems improve 
quality127 or reliably generate cost savings through reduced utilization or improved 
efficiency.128 Although there may be limits on the generalizability of any one of the 
studies, it is notable that all the data point in the same direction: that vertical health 
care integration is associated with increased prices and higher per patient health 
care spending. 
III. THE CENTRAL ROLE OF STATES 
Due to significant inefficiencies in the health care markets and the limits of 
federal antitrust enforcement, states have an important role to play to complement 
and support federal efforts to address the competitive threats of health care 
integration. When market power abuses lead to higher prices and reductions in 
quality and consumer choice, the primary remedy has been federal antitrust 
enforcement. But while federal antitrust enforcement has a key role to play, it 
cannot be the only weapon in the arsenal. First, given the rapid rate of collaboration 
and consolidation in health care, the Federal Trade Commission and the 
Department of Justice (the Antitrust Agencies) simply do not have the resources or 
capacity to police all of the consolidation efforts under way throughout the 
country.129 Second, federal antitrust enforcement offers a powerful means of 
preventing anticompetitive mergers and collaborations but has proven less 
successful at balancing the pro- and anticompetitive effects of a proposed merger or 
                                                                                                                 
 
 127. J. Michael McWilliams, Michael E. Chernew, Alan M. Zaslavsky, Pasha Hamed & 
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correcting anticompetitive conduct following consolidation.130 At a time when state 
and federal governments are incentivizing vertical integration, and in which the 
majority of health care markets in the United States are already highly 
concentrated,131 policy makers need more nuanced tools that they can deploy 
throughout the country.  
States are in a unique position to assist in this effort. First, state governments 
oversee most of the regulation of insurance and health care within the state, which 
will enable them to design new policies that complement existing regulatory struc-
tures. For instance, states could require payers to report all of their claims to a state 
all-payer claims database (APCD)132 to promote a better understanding of the 
drivers of health care prices and provide federal antitrust agencies with valuable 
information on markets throughout the state. Second, state actors may have existing 
relationships with market stakeholders and a better understanding of market 
dynamics in local health care markets, which can improve policy selection. Third, 
state attorneys general have broader mandates than federal antitrust enforcement 
agencies, which enable them to analyze the actions of health care providers and 
insurer organizations through a consumer-protection or community-benefits lens, 
broadening both the range of harms that are evaluated and potential enforcement 
tools. Fourth, allowing states to monitor the impact of vertical integration in a wide 
variety of market settings and try different regulatory approaches will speed 
understanding of whether and under what circumstances the benefits of engaging in 
vertical integration outweigh the risks. Finally, states can learn and exchange best 
practices for developing APCDs and other regulatory models, easing the transition 
for states with less experience.133 Enhancing state and federal collaboration will 
expand both the information and policy tools available to regulators aiming to 
control health care costs, as well as allow available resources to be targeted to the 
most appropriate entities and markets. 
Increasing state involvement does create some risks. Most importantly, the 
existence of relationships between market stakeholders and government officials 
also risks agency capture and undue political influence over legislation and 
regulation.134 Many states have had well-intentioned policy initiatives, such as 
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certificate-of-need laws and licensure programs, co-opted by political and financial 
interests.135 In states with powerful health provider or insurance entities, 
maintaining the independence of the APCD and oversight entities will be essential. 
For example, the Massachusetts legislature created the Massachusetts Health Policy 
Commission (HPC) as an independent state agency that resides in, but is not under 
the control of, the Executive Office of Administration and Finance. HPC is “not 
subject to the supervision and control of any other executive office, department, 
commission, board, bureau, agency or political subdivision of the 
commonwealth.”136 Instead, an eleven-member Board of Commissioners with 
guidance from a broadly representative advisory council govern the agency.137 HPC 
is funded solely by assessments taken from industry participants rather than from 
state general revenue.138 Given the wealth and political power of many insurance 
companies and health care systems, state legislatures should carefully insulate any 
oversight entities in terms of both governance and funding. 
Further, state regulation without the requisite expertise and resources to engage 
in continued oversight and enforcement risks exacerbating existing problems. Re-
cently, several states have offered immunity from state and federal antitrust laws to 
vertically integrating health care entities, which drew criticism from federal 
officials who argued the practice potentially immunizes anticompetitive behavior 
and results in consumer harm if the states fail to appropriately oversee and regulate 
the entities.139 As successful oversight and enforcement measures often require 
substantial financial, personnel, and knowledge-based resources, states must 
carefully assess which policy options are best suited to their particular 
circumstances. In addition, federal and state government officials should 
collaborate and coordinate their efforts as much as possible to promote efficient 
oversight and regulation of health care integration. 
Vertical integration in health care continues to be encouraged by state and 
federal government entities as a means to control overutilization and promote 
quality. To maintain control over the amount of consolidation in the health care 
market and guide entities in how to structure their integrations in ways that promote 
competition, regulators need improved information on how integration may lead to 
abuses of market power, greater guidance on the appropriate balance between pro- 
and anticompetitive effects, and more nuanced oversight and regulatory tools. With 
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the limits of federal antitrust tools to address vertical integration in health care, 
states are uniquely situated to manage the price and quality effects of the emerging 
forms of health care combinations, but they must be cognizant of the political risks, 
resources, and competencies necessary to take on such a role. As set forth in Part 
IV, this federalized, “laboratory of the states” model allows jurisdictions to tailor 
policies to the specifics of the state’s own health care markets.  
IV. STATE OPTIONS TO ADDRESS THE DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD 
Because of the limits of federal antitrust enforcement and of market forces to 
discipline private health care prices, states have the opportunity to complement and 
supplement federal efforts to address the potential harm to competition from 
increased health care consolidation. The double-edged sword of health care 
integration requires states to grapple with ways to balance the potential efficiency 
benefits while controlling the price effects of consolidation. To do so, states can 
encourage clinical integration, but with a quid pro quo that the integrating entities 
must submit to price and quality oversight.  
Part IV explores a range of policy options states can use to further these ends. 
The strategies include: (A) all-payer claims databases; (B) antitrust enforcement 
and immunity; (C) ACO certification; (D) rate-oversight authorities; (E) private 
rate caps; and (F) provider rate regulation.  
These policy options for state oversight of health care integration are explored in 
order of least to most regulatory intervention in the market, which also generally 
correlates to political difficulty. Although the best combination of these tools will 
depend on the specific market and political dynamics in each particular state, as a 
general matter, the more consolidated and concentrated a state’s health care market, 
the more the state may have to rely on the stronger regulatory devices to curb rising 
health care prices. 
While states may pick and choose from this menu of policy options, three key 
ingredients emerge for effective state oversight of vertical integration and private 
price increases: (1) Information—oversight bodies must have access to detailed and 
timely price, quality, and utilization claim data; (2) Independence—state oversight 
bodies must be insulated from the powerful providers they oversee; (3) Regulatory 
Authority—state oversight bodies must have the authority to enforce or impose 
limits on providers’ prices when they become too high. 
A. All-Payer Claims Databases 
To evaluate the impact of integration on health care costs and quality, states 
must first gain access to reliable data about their health care prices, quality of care, 
and market dynamics. This information will inform the analysis of the role that 
market leverage, as opposed to value, plays in setting negotiated health care prices. 
 Obtaining negotiated health care prices will not be an easy task. Private health 
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care prices are notoriously opaque and difficult to ascertain.140 Different plans pay 
the same provider different prices for the same service. Providers’ charges vary 
wildly from each other for the same service in the same geographic areas.141 
Furthermore, nondisclosure agreements, trade secrets claims, and highly complex 
billing mechanisms shroud health care prices in a veil of secrecy.142 But states can 
get around many of these barriers by requiring disclosure of the information to a 
state entity.143  
About a third of all states currently require disclosure of health care claims to an 
all-payer claims database (APCD).144 APCDs are large-scale, state-run databases 
that collect health care claims data and provider data from all payers in the state, 
including private insurers, Medicaid, the Children’s Health Insurance Program 
(CHIP), self-insured employers, dental insurers, prescription drug plans, state 
employee health plans, and others. Furthermore, several APCDs pair price and 
quality data for providers.145 States generally use APCDs to collect data on patient 
demographics, diagnoses, services rendered, charges, payments, and procedure 
codes.146 According to the APCD Council, a nonprofit entity that monitors APCD 
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creation, eighteen states have enacted legislation to create an APCD, with another 
twenty states demonstrating a strong interest in doing so.147  
APCDs are often thought of as tools for promoting consumer price transpar-
ency,148 but their functions go far beyond providing pricing information to consum-
ers. For example, by marrying claims data with quality assessments, APCDs can al-
low policy makers to monitor the impact of vertical integration on price and quality 
under various market conditions. Given the experimental nature of ACOs, access to 
data is essential to evaluating whether they can achieve their procompetitive goals 
of promoting quality improvement and cost-saving efficiency, or whether their 
potential anticompetitive effects outweigh any consumer benefit. For instance, 
policy makers will need to know whether vertical integration in their market 
changes provider referral patterns in ways that harm quality of care or patient 
outcomes. With all the changes set in motion by the ACA, it is essential to be able 
to learn from experience and adapt regulations quickly in response to shifting 
market dynamics.149  
The collection of APCD data both underlies and informs all of the subsequent 
policy options discussed below and should be a precursor to the selection of an ap-
proach to manage the double-edged sword of health care integration and consolida-
tion. Policy makers could use APCD data to implement policy incentives targeting 
consumers, purchasers, providers, and payers. For instance, if a dominant provider 
engaged in anticompetitive conduct to drive up prices to supracompetitive levels, 
the state could consider bringing an antitrust enforcement action, implementing 
some form of rate regulation, or finding ways to incentivize market entry.  
While the creation of an APCD presents numerous opportunities and benefits, 
doing so also raises significant challenges. Without question, the creation and 
maintenance of any statewide database will require substantial financial support 
and resources. However, with APCDs, obtaining a usable, standardized, and 
complete set of data from various payers and providers poses the biggest challenge. 
For example, all quality, price, and patient data must be converted to standardized 
metrics and all patient data must be de-identified. Given the confidential nature of 
the database, the state will also need to impose significant data-security measures. 
States may also face additional challenges from providers and insurers claiming 
that the pricing data constitutes a trade secret or is subject to a nondisclosure 
agreement.150 State legislatures can address many of these concerns directly by 
requiring payers and providers to submit health care claims data in standardized 
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formats to the state APCD and including a provision that exempts APCD reporting 
requirements from nondisclosure agreements and trade secrets claims.151 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court recently dealt a significant blow to state 
APCDs in Gobeille v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.152 The 6-2 opinion held that 
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) preempts state APCD 
reporting requirements for self-funded employee health plans, depriving states of 
essential information on health care utilization, pricing, and quality.153 Nationally, 
61% of workers with employer-based health insurance are in self-funded plans, 
which represents a significant portion of the population state health policy makers 
aim to target with healthcare reforms.154 Moreover, individuals with employer-
based health insurance tend to be healthier than those covered by public payers, so 
removing claims data for a majority of individuals with employer-based coverage 
from the database can skew the data and undermine the accuracy of any policy 
analysis performed using the data.155 
States seeking to obtain claims data for employees with self-insured employers 
have three options after Gobeille.156 First, states could gather and analyze the more 
limited set of health care claims data by continuing to require APCD data from all 
other types of payers, including fully insured employee-benefit plans, public 
payers, and individual and small-group plans within and outside the exchanges, and 
by encouraging self-insured employee health plans to submit information on a 
voluntary basis.157 Second, despite being less efficient and more expensive than 
obtaining the data from payers, states could require health care providers to submit 
the missing data from self-insured employees.158 Finally, states could request that 
the federal government, via the Departments of Labor and Health and Human 
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Council, supra note 144.  
 158. See Nicholas Bagley, The Supreme Court’s Wrongheaded Decision in Gobeille, 
INCIDENTAL ECONOMIST (Mar. 3, 2016, 11:50 AM), 
http://theincidentaleconomist.com/wordpress 
/the-supreme-courts-wrongheaded-decision-in-gobeille/ [https://perma.cc/Q87P-5G4X]. 
2016] DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD OF HEALTH CARE INTEGRATION 83 
 
Services, mandate collection of relevant claims data from ERISA plans.159 A 
federal requirement could standardize data for inclusion in all state APCDs, which 
could facilitate data analysis and comparison between states.  
A final challenge is that creation of an APCD requires significant thought 
regarding the amount and scope of data disclosure. Several antitrust enforcers and 
academics have expressed concerns that, depending on the market dynamics, 
widespread disclosure of all health care price and quality data could lead to 
increased prices or collusion.160 Determining which data to disclose, to whom, and 
in which market, will require substantial analysis and oversight, which again 
requires resources.  
Despite these numerous challenges, states need comprehensive health care price, 
utilization, and quality data to inform their health care cost-containment policies. 
Thus, states must strive to collect and access this data notwithstanding these chal-
lenges. Information forms the basis of any effective state action to address to the 
competitive risks of health care integration and consolidation.  
B. Antitrust Enforcement and Immunity 
Having reliable data will greatly facilitate state decision making on when to in-
centivize or curtail health care integration. States can manipulate the use of state 
and federal antitrust laws to either vigorously challenge anticompetitive conduct or 
immunize certain actors from prosecution under the laws via the state action 
doctrine. A state with highly concentrated health care markets can actively enforce 
state and federal antitrust laws to prevent proposed integration from harming 
competition. Alternatively, states can encourage integration by granting state action 
immunity from state and federal antitrust laws to integrated health care entities via 
legislation or Certificates of Public Advantage (COPAs).161 Regardless of a state’s 
chosen path, vigorous oversight and significant data monitoring will be essential to 
controlling costs and preserving quality in the face of increased concentration. 
1. Antitrust Enforcement  
States can challenge anticompetitive conduct by enforcement of the federal or its 
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own state antitrust laws. At the federal level, the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act 
prohibit anticompetitive mergers, collaborations, and conduct.162 In addition, forty-
nine states have their own antitrust laws that promote and protect competition.163 
Given the market-specific information required to bring an antitrust enforcement 
challenge, state officials are well positioned to identify integration proposals that 
threaten to harm competition. State attorneys general can challenge mergers and 
collaborations and bring enforcement actions both independently and in 
conjunction with a federal action. Joining with the federal antitrust agencies to 
bring an action can be an especially effective means for states to leverage both the 
expertise and resources of the federal agencies as well as their own knowledge of 
existing market dynamics.164  
State attorneys general, like the federal antitrust agencies, generally have the op-
portunity to review a proposed integration, which could be a formal merger or a 
looser collaboration, both at the time of its creation and on an ongoing basis. While 
the antitrust analysis typically differs between horizontal mergers, vertical mergers, 
and collaborations, the FTC generally considers similar factors when addressing 
health care provider integrations.165 At the time of a proposed integration, antitrust 
enforcers initially consider whether a proposed merger or collaboration is per se il-
legal.166 Initial concerns for enforcers include (1) whether the integration could 
create potential efficiencies such as cost savings, quality improvement, and 
transactional efficiencies; (2) whether the proposed integration is a legitimate 
attempt to achieve those efficiencies or a means to enhance market power; and (3) 
whether the efficiency goals could be obtained through a means that poses less of a 
threat to competition.167 For an existing entity, enforcers consider whether the 
current conduct of the entity is on balance harming competition. If on initial review 
the state finds that its antitrust concerns are not satisfied, it can engage in further 
investigation. 
Given the potential benefits of vertical integration in health care, the majority of 
proposed integrations should survive initial review and not be challenged as per se 
illegal. Once a bona fide integration is established, antitrust enforcers will review 
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the integration under a “rule of reason” standard.168 As the Director of the FTC’s 
Bureau of Competition Deborah Feinstein pointed out at the Fifth National 
Accountable Care Organization Summit in June 2014, “the rule of reason analysis 
applied to provider collaborations generally follows the same framework contained 
in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines.”169 The rule of reason analysis compares the 
state of competition with and without the proposed integration and requires the 
parties to define the relevant product and geographic markets, identify the market 
participants, calculate market shares and concentration, consider the likelihood of 
market expansion, and determine whether any efficiencies are likely to result.170 
Antitrust enforcers will further examine whether the proposed integration will 
likely harm competition by increasing “the ability or incentive profitably to raise 
price above or reduce output, quality, service, or innovation below what likely 
would prevail” in its absence.171 Rule of reason analysis is flexible and market 
specific in its inquiry, and no one factor is dispositive.172  
The most challenging question facing antitrust enforcers in the case of vertical 
integration is whether the purported procompetitive effects of the integration will 
outweigh any anticompetitive effects. Before antitrust enforcers will credit any pro-
competitive efficiencies, the health care entities must demonstrate that the claimed 
efficiencies are sufficiently cognizable, explicit, and require the proposed level of 
integration (merger, joint venture, or affiliation) to produce the procompetitive ef-
fects.173 Doing so has proven extremely difficult.174 For instance, the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals found in Saint Alphonsus Medical Center-Nampa, Inc. v. St. 
Luke’s Health System that the quality benefits obtained from sharing electronic 
medical records, standardizing treatment protocols, and integrating physicians 
across practices did not require a formal merger; that is, they were not “merger 
specific.”175 Although the Ninth Circuit decided St. Luke’s based purely on the 
anticompetitive potential of the proposed horizontal merger of primary care 
physician practices in Nampa, Idaho, the principle that a merger was not necessary 
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to achieve the purported efficiencies would also apply in the analysis of a vertical 
merger.  
The complexity of vertical health care integrations will significantly complicate 
antitrust analysis.176 Vertical integrations can harm competition in upstream and 
downstream markets, as well as in entirely different markets.177 For example, 
Health First, an integrated delivery system in Brevard, Florida, owns and operates 
health plans, hospitals, physician groups, urgent care centers, outpatient centers, 
rehabilitation facilities, diagnostic and treatment centers, and a network of fitness 
and wellness services.178 In these cases, it will not be sufficient to analyze only the 
impact of the integration in each market in isolation, but instead antitrust enforcers 
and courts should analyze the more global impact of the integration on the 
particular health care market. This makes conducting the competitive effects 
analysis significantly more complex.179 Further, state enforcers may have to 
consider how to balance procompetitive effects in one market, such as primary 
care, with anticompetitive effects in an altogether different market, such as surgical 
procedures, or whether quality improvements for certain services outweigh across 
the board price increases.180 All of this will require extensive amounts of time, 
resources, data, and analysis to accomplish in any meaningful way. 
However, once a state has decided that a proposed or existing integration is anti-
competitive, it must decide upon a remedy. The goal of any antitrust enforcement 
action is to restore the opportunity for the market to function without the illegal re-
straints on competition.181 Antitrust enforcers generally have two kinds of equitable 
remedies to choose from: structural and conduct remedies. Depending on the 
timing of the action and the market conditions, states can use structural and conduct 
remedies alone or in combination to address anticompetitive concerns arising from 
greater consolidation in health care.  
a. Structural Remedies 
Antitrust enforcers use structural remedies to prevent a proposed merger, to 
undo a recent merger, or to require divestiture or other structural change in order to 
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restore competition.182 In the instance that a vertically integrated entity has not yet 
or only recently formed, structural remedies offer a relatively straightforward 
means of restoring competition by dissolving the integration. Given the level of 
concentration in both the health care insurance and provider markets, antitrust 
enforcers have expressed a strong preference for structural remedies,183 as 
preventing anticompetitive harms prior to consolidation has proven more successful 
than attempting to address them after the entities have fully integrated.184  
While structural remedies are frequently used to prevent horizontal mergers, 
their use in vertical mergers has rarely occurred because antitrust enforcers 
generally view vertical integration as procompetitive.185 However, given the 
evidence that vertical health care integration can increase provider market leverage 
and prices, antitrust enforcers should consider structural remedies, both when 
evaluating proposed vertical integrations and when an existing consolidated entity 
continues to amass or abuse its market power.186  
In the case of proposed vertical integrations, antitrust enforcers should consider 
structural remedies in three instances. First, they should be especially wary of pro-
posed integrations that appear overinclusive in the number of hospitals and/or phy-
sicians participating in the integration, as this may signal an attempt to gain market 
power in ways that are unnecessary to the efficiency goals of vertical integration.187 
Second, in instances where the integration would involve a significant number of 
providers in a particular area, questions arise regarding whether those providers are 
eligible to see patients independently from the entity or subject to exclusivity 
requirements and whether the integration will substantially limit consumer choice. 
Third, vertical integrations that consolidate market power across several different 
provider markets can create significant leverage in negotiating reimbursements, 
such that the entity becomes a “must have” and threatens the ability of other 
organizations to compete.188  
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Despite the oft-repeated reminder that mergers, once consummated, are difficult, 
if not impossible, to unwind, the highly concentrated nature of U.S. health care 
markets suggests antitrust enforcers should seriously consider using structural 
remedies to break down some of the market leverage some providers have amassed 
over the last several decades.189 Over the last several decades, health care entities 
have come to rely on the fact that mergers, once consummated, will not be undone. 
As a result, health care entities have strong incentives to consolidate, even in the 
face of increased monitoring or limitations via conduct remedies, because the 
limitations are only temporary, but the gain in market power is permanent. In many 
markets, health care provider organizations have systematically accumulated 
market power and abused it in ways that have significantly increased costs and 
eliminated competitors. Such abuses of power could result in anticompetitive 
conduct claims under Section 1 of the Sherman Act or monopolization and 
attempted monopolization claims under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.190 Antitrust 
enforcers have the authority to break this market power down in two ways: division 
of a larger entity into several smaller entities191 or required divestitures in certain 
geographic regions.192 The most prominent example of division of an existing 
entity into smaller ones occurred in 1983 when the Department of Justice 
successfully litigated its case against AT&T, resulting in the divestiture of several 
“Baby Bells.”193 Assistant Attorney General William Baxter created the “Bell 
Doctrine” to prevent local telephone service providers from leveraging their legally 
acquired monopolies in local markets to monopolize the national long distance 
market.194 While the Bell Doctrine was designed for regulated monopolies, many of 
its principles can be analogized to dominant health care organizations.195 A 
successful state or federal antitrust challenge resulting in divestitures, or other 
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structural remedies dividing the entity into smaller parts, would serve as a strong 
deterrent to other entities.  
In sum, state antitrust enforcers should use structural remedies to prevent poten-
tially anticompetitive collaborations and mergers from existing, and to break up 
those integrated entities that systematically amass and abuse market power.  
b. Conduct Remedies 
The majority of vertical integrations, however, are unlikely to require structural 
remedies, as they will present substantial procompetitive effects that are not so 
clearly outweighed by potential harm to competition. In these instances, conduct 
remedies are more frequently used to curb anticompetitive behaviors. State and fed-
eral antitrust enforcers have typically used conduct remedies to address anti-
competitive concerns arising from vertical mergers and joint ventures; the agencies 
believed that conduct remedies would enable an entity to gain the procompetitive 
benefits of the vertical integration while still restricting any potential 
anticompetitive conduct.196 
 Conduct remedies can be used in two ways to regulate the anticompetitive 
harms that may arise from vertical integration. First, conduct remedies provide a 
means to limit anticompetitive behavior in a health care entity that has obtained a 
significant amount of market power without requiring it to divest portions of its 
business in ways that may compromise patient care.197 Second, for entities that are 
integrating to create an ACO or other form of integrated delivery system, conduct 
remedies offer a tool to protect competition in ways that are tailored to the concerns 
of a particular market, while still enabling providers the opportunity to achieve the 
desired procompetitive effects of clinical integration. 
The use of vertical integration and ACOs to control costs and improve quality in 
health care is still largely experimental. Like any experiment, the model will 
require iterative refinement and oversight to improve its results. Conduct remedies 
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permit this iterative process to continue to maximize the benefits of integration, 
while minimizing the harm to competition. For example, depending on the 
concerns in a particular market, antitrust enforcers could impose direct price caps, 
limits on total health care expenditures, limits on contract provisions,198 
requirements to preserve existing services, prohibitions on employment restrictions, 
and limits on further acquisitions on health care providers.  
But using conduct remedies effectively is challenging. Historically, the antitrust 
agencies have not favored the use of conduct remedies to control the 
anticompetitive effects of proposed horizontal mergers or collaborations.199 Their 
logic is relevant to vertical integration as well. First, unlike structural remedies, 
conduct remedies do not restore the status quo with respect to competition.200 
Instead, they provide restrictions and oversight over the newly integrated entity, 
which are often inferior substitutes for competition between independent 
providers.201 For instance, direct price caps have been used to control cost increases 
following a merger, but it is not clear if the price caps are higher than what a 
competitive market would permit.202 Further, conduct remedies often focus on 
price, but they are unable to take account of other impacts of competition like 
quality improvement and innovation.203 Second, conduct remedies are often 
difficult to enforce and have high administrative costs.204 Enforcing conduct 
remedies requires the enforcement agency to either oversee enforcement itself or 
hire a third party to monitor the entity, both of which require substantial resources. 
In some instances, enforcement can be so expensive and burdensome that the 
remedy can be self-defeating. Finally, conduct remedies are generally time-limited, 
which begs the question of what happens when the consent decree ends. Health 
care entities may find it financially rewarding to consolidate and accept the conduct 
remedies and oversight in the short term to obtain greater market leverage in the 
future.  
In comparison to their federal counterparts, state attorneys general may be better 
positioned and more willing to use conduct remedies. State officials will be more 
familiar with local stakeholders and market dynamics, and they may be more 
willing to engage in conduct oversight than to litigate a merger challenge. For 
instance, the Pennsylvania Attorney General has successfully negotiated three 
consent decrees since 2011 with Geisinger Health System.205 The most recent 
decree, involving Geisinger’s acquisition of Lewiston Health Care Foundation, 
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required caps on price increases and prohibited most-favored-nation and anti-
tiering provisions.206  
In Massachusetts, the then-Attorney General, Martha Coakley, negotiated an ex-
tensive consent decree with Partners Healthcare conditioning its acquisition of 
South Shore Hospital and two Hallmark hospitals on several factors including (1) 
caps on price increases and total health care expenditures; (2) component 
contracting, which permits health plans to contract with all or some of Partners’s 
four major components; (3) limitations on Partners’s ability to contract with payers 
on behalf of affiliated providers; (4) preservation of existing services; and (5) 
Attorney General approval for any further acquisitions.207 The Partners consent 
decree was ultimately rejected after substantial opposition from the Massachusetts 
Health Policy Commission (HPC),208 which estimated that the merger would result 
in approximately forty million dollars in increased health care expenditures per 
year and Partners having more discharges than the next four largest competitors in 
the state combined.209 HPC’s impact on the outcome of the Partners merger 
demonstrates the importance of states having readily available access to price, 
quality, and utilization data for analysis. If the financial impact of the proposed 
Partners acquisition had not been so significant, HPC would have been well-suited 
to oversee the merger and the conditions of the consent decree. Few states have an 
agency that has the data, analytical tools, authority, and resources that HPC does to 
monitor an actor’s health care system and its costs. Although it has only been in 
existence for three years, HPC has already played a large role in shaping the future 
of health care in Massachusetts, and its role in antitrust enforcement will continue 
to develop. Other states interested in regulating health care costs should follow 
HPC’s lead, using its progress and setbacks as guidance for policy design. 
Overall, antitrust enforcement is an essential tool for states to curb increases in 
health care costs driven by abuses of provider and payer market power. But it can 
be too blunt or unwieldy an instrument to strike the delicate balance needed to 
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promote beneficial integration in health care while preventing providers and payers 
from acquiring too much market power. In some instances, legislation may be 
preferable to conduct remedies for behavior that states wish to curb across all 
actors, like all-or-nothing provisions or most-favored-nation clauses. If enforcers 
fear eliminating procompetitive efficiencies, they may opt to delay enforcement in 
ways that can cause lasting harm to competition. Likewise, if used too aggressively, 
the threat of antitrust enforcement could chill integration efforts. 
2. State Action Immunity and Certificates of Public Advantage 
In some instances, state and federal governments may wish to alleviate that 
chilling effect of antitrust law by signaling to health care entities that they favor 
promoting integration over protecting competition. The courts have granted states 
the ability to regulate the market in ways that promote other policy goals even if 
those ways may harm competition.210 In Parker v. Brown, the Supreme Court 
granted states the ability to offer state action immunity, which would displace the 
antitrust laws in favor of public supervision, so long as their actions did not unduly 
burden interstate commerce or violate the Constitution.211 States seeking to exempt 
nonsovereign private actors from state and federal antitrust enforcement must 
demonstrate that the exemption arises from a “clearly articulated and affirmatively 
expressed . . . state policy” and that the policy is “actively supervised by the 
State.”212 States can grant non-sovereign entities immunity through a range of 
actions including direct legislation, agency action, or by granting a certificate of 
public advantage (COPA). Currently, thirteen states have statutes authorizing the 
state to grant a COPA or state action immunity.213  
 It is unclear whether state action immunity has successfully promoted beneficial 
integration while protecting competition. In recent years, use of state action 
immunity has come under significant scrutiny, especially in health care, as several 
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states had granted immunity without proper articulation of state purpose or 
supervision.214 Robert Berenson and Randall Bovbjerg performed an extensive case 
study of a COPA granted in North Carolina that enabled Mission Health System 
(“Mission”) in Asheville to acquire its major rival, St. Joseph’s Health System.215 
North Carolina granted Mission a COPA in exchange for an agreement to a “quasi-
regulatory” regime that controlled Mission’s overall profit margins, its average 
inpatient and outpatient costs, and the share of primary physicians it could 
employ.216 After analyzing years of data, the researchers were unable to conclude 
that the COPA effectively counteracted the loss of competition in the area, but they 
did find that the model had some successes and with modifications “a COPA-like 
approach could provide a useful complement to antitrust enforcement in addressing 
market power.”217 
If carefully limited and executed properly, a COPA may offer a state several 
benefits over antitrust enforcement alone. First, it could give states the ability to 
experiment with vertical integration in health care in ways that attempt to balance 
the benefits of clinical integration with the risks to competition. Second, protection 
from antitrust prosecution offers health care entities further incentive to submit to 
data reporting and monitoring that can provide essential information on the impact 
of vertical integration in different market conditions. Such data would also enable 
states to monitor the impact of various forms of antitrust immunity on price or 
utilization as a result of a merger over time. Finally, properly executed state action 
immunity could offer the opportunity to closely monitor and regulate far more 
health care entities than federal enforcement agencies could cover alone and for 
longer periods of time than conduct remedies.  
But the state must have a clearly defined regulatory body assigned to monitor 
and regulate the entities, as well as the financial and personnel resources to do so. 
A COPA that grants antitrust immunity without appropriate oversight risks 
significant harm to consumers. In fact, federal antitrust enforcement officials have 
recently raised significant concerns about whether state action immunity may do 
more harm than good.218 Edith Ramirez, Chairwoman of the FTC, expressed 
concerns that in some states the grant of antitrust immunity in an effort to promote 
collaboration and integration “betrays a misunderstanding of the crucial role that 
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competition plays in the healthcare sector.”219 She reiterated the careful balancing 
that federal antitrust enforcement agencies conduct when reviewing a proposed 
merger or collaboration, including a weighing of the procompetitive and 
anticompetitive effects of a proposed integration.220 Without careful supervision 
and narrowly defined limits on the scope of antitrust immunity, COPAs and grants 
of state action immunity risk exacerbating antitrust concerns rather than 
ameliorating them.  
The FTC further demonstrated its skepticism of COPAs and state action 
immunity recently with respect to New York’s COPA for health care 
collaboratives.221 In reviewing an application for a COPA, New York considers (1) 
the potential benefits of the health care provider collaborative activities, including 
preservation of needed health care services, improvement in quality and access to 
services, lower costs, and improvements in payment methodologies; (2) the health 
care provider landscape; (3) the potential disadvantages of the collaborative 
activities; (4) the availability of alternatives that would be less harmful to 
competition; and (5) the extent to which active supervision will mitigate the risks 
associated with the collaboration.222 Despite its review process, New York’s COPA 
immunity raised substantial concerns at the FTC that such immunity would 
promote anticompetitive behavior arising from healthcare integration.223 On April 
22, 2015, the FTC sent a letter to the Center for Health Care Policy and Resource 
Development in New York, claiming that the FTC fully recognized the potential 
procompetitive benefits that can arise from health care collaborations but that the 
COPA exemptions “are based on inaccurate premises about the antitrust laws and 
the value of collaboration among health care providers.”224 The FTC found that a 
COPA was unnecessary to enable providers to engage in procompetitive 
collaborative activities, but it threatened to “immunize conduct that would not 
generate efficiencies and therefore not pass muster under the antitrust laws.”225 The 
FTC went on to argue that the COPA risked increasing health care costs and 
decreasing access to consumers in New York. States considering offering state 
action immunity through legislation or a COPA program must be aware of FTC’s 
concerns and carefully condition the immunity on significant data reporting 
requirements, regulatory oversight, and explicit boundaries of antitrust 
exemption.226  
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In general, while we favor incentivizing health insurers and providers to provide 
price and quality data, we remain skeptical that offering immunity to state and 
federal antitrust laws is an advisable means of doing so. States with no other 
options should consider creating clear price, quality, and concentration thresholds 
that would trigger revocation of the immunity. 
States must determine how to best employ their antitrust laws to promote 
competition and efficiency in the health care markets. Data collection and analysis 
of health care prices, insurance premiums, utilization rates, and quality of care will 
be essential to this effort. Such data would enable state officials to identify 
anticompetitive collaborations as early as possible, and seek to revoke immunity or 
engage in some form of antitrust enforcement if entities violated the terms of the 
immunity. While states have a significant role to play in antitrust enforcement, as 
Robert Berenson previously noted, antitrust enforcement “can only be one—and 
not the primary—approach to addressing provider pricing power.”227 
C. ACO Certification 
To monitor the impact of vertical integration on price, quality, and competition, 
state certification programs can offer a more comprehensive and preferable alterna-
tive to COPAs and state action immunity. Unlike the regulatory approval and 
reporting requirements for Medicare ACOs, there is no regime of oversight for 
commercial ACOs. States can take a more active role overseeing health care 
integration, particularly commercial ACOs, by creating Certificate of Authority 
programs. States can tailor the Certificate of Authority requirements to enable them 
to achieve their particular policy goals. Key considerations include determining 
which state entity will oversee the certification, whether certification will be 
mandatory or voluntary, whether to require antitrust and solvency reviews, what 
price and quality disclosures to require, and whether to incentivize integration by 
granting antitrust immunity and exemptions to other state laws.228 Certification 
programs also allow states to review these features of any particular ACO both 
prior to certification and on an ongoing basis. Gathering historical and ongoing 
price and quality data will enable states to monitor market dynamics, inform future 
decisions regarding integration, and support antitrust enforcement actions. 
To date, three states have established Certificate of Authority programs for com-
mercial ACOs—Texas, Massachusetts, and New York.229 The features of the three 
different programs reflect each state’s goals and concerns. Certification presents es-
sentially a quid pro quo, where the state offers a range of benefits to the integrating 
entity—typically an ACO—in exchange for a more in-depth review up front and 
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continued oversight.230 Massachusetts has a voluntary ACO Certification Program 
governed by the Massachusetts Health Policy Commission. ACOs seeking 
certification must satisfy several minimum standards, including the use of 
alternative payment methodologies, providing medical and behavioral health 
services across the continuum, and allowing for health care price transparency in 
exchange for an HPC “seal of approval” and the opportunity for preferential 
contracting with state-funded insurance contracts.231 As to data gathering, HPC 
already requires all provider organizations of a certain size and scope to register 
and submit data on costs and charges to the Center for Health Information and 
Analysis, but any ACO applying for certification must also register as a provider 
and disclose such information regardless of size or scope.232 While the ACO 
certification process and its requirements are still under development, HPC has yet 
to require a solvency review or offer further potential incentives for ACO 
formation, such as immunity or a safe harbor from state and federal antitrust laws, 
exemption from state self-referral, or other consumer protection laws.233 According 
to staff members at HPC, a seal of approval from the state “is a meaningful 
distinction in a competitive marketplace, such as Massachusetts,”234 which may 
provide sufficient incentive for ACO certification, negating the need for the state to 
grant such legal exemptions. 
In Texas, the Department of Insurance governs the certification of Health Care 
Collaboratives (HCCs), Texas’s version of ACOs.235 Certification is mandatory for 
the HCC to take on certain levels of financial risk, and the program focuses mostly 
on the antitrust implications of HCCs.236 To obtain certification, an HCC must 
demonstrate the willingness and ability to increase collaboration and integration 
among health care providers; promote improvements in care quality and outcomes; 
reduce preventable medical errors; contain costs without jeopardizing quality; and 
gather, analyze, and report statistics on health care costs, quality, access, and 
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utilization.237 In addition, the HCC must fund and engage in an in-depth antitrust 
review that provides evidence that the proposed collaboration is not likely to harm 
competition and that the procompetitive effects of the collaboration outweigh any 
anticompetitive effects of increased market power.238 Having the applicants fund 
the reviews saves state resources, but may also discourage health care entities from 
forming HCCs. To date, no health care provider organization has applied for certifi-
cation as an HCC in Texas, and so whether this type of certification serves to 
protect competition or discourage integration remains uncertain.  
In contrast to Massachusetts and Texas, New York’s voluntary certificate of au-
thority for commercial ACOs both demands more of and offers more to applying 
ACOs. New York encourages clinical and financial integration by offering to 
exempt qualifying ACOs from prosecution under the corporate practice of medicine 
doctrine, state and federal antitrust laws, and prohibitions on fee splitting and self-
referrals.239 In exchange, the ACO must agree to “[p]rovide, manage and coordinate 
health care . . . for a defined population . . . ; [b]e accountable for quality, cost, and 
delivery of health care to ACO patients; [n]egotiate, receive and distribute any 
shared savings or losses; and [e]stablish, report and ensure provider compliance 
with health care criteria including quality performance standards.”240 In addition to 
the materials requested for initial certification application, ACOs applying for a 
COPA must submit any additional information requested by the state during the 
COPA review process described above.241 
State certification of ACOs offers a means of incentivizing beneficial integration 
in health care while offering states the opportunity to gather valuable cost and 
quality data to determine the impact of such integration on the dynamics in the 
health care markets. States considering certification should monitor the success of 
Massachusetts, Texas, and New York to determine which elements of their 
programs to emulate. The design of an ACO certification program entails policy 
tradeoffs. For instance, mandatory certification enables states to guarantee 
oversight and access to essential cost and quality data, but it may create substantial 
barriers to ACO formation, which states may still want to encourage. By contrast, 
the promise of state action immunity via a COPA may encourage ACO formation, 
but it may also unduly protect entities that engage in anticompetitive behavior and 
abuse market power. Finally, voluntary certification programs that do not offer 
significant benefits may not enroll many ACOs, which would significantly hinder 
the state’s ability to monitor and regulate the activities of integrating health care 
entities.  
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D. Rate Oversight Authority 
A step beyond ACO certification models that only apply to certain forms of inte-
gration is to vest more widespread rate oversight authority in a rate oversight body. 
There are two models of oversight authority: (1) an independent rate commission 
that reviews and oversees provider rates; or (2) expanding the insurance rate 
review authority of the state department of insurance. Authorities under both 
models can be vested with a spectrum of authority ranging from weaker reporting 
or recommendation power to stronger rate approval and enforcement power. To be 
effective, however, the rate oversight body should be insulated from capture by the 
providers or insurers it regulates and possess regulatory and enforcement authority 
to limit rate increases. 
1. Rate Oversight Commission 
States can establish an independent rate oversight commission to oversee 
providers’ health care prices and transactions in their state. A rate oversight 
commission’s charge typically includes authority to study and make 
recommendations on proposed health care mergers and to monitor prices and 
quality data postmerger. But a more powerful oversight model vests the oversight 
commission with regulatory authority to enforce and limit excessive provider 
prices.  
In states that have established an APCD, a commission could have authority to 
analyze statewide claims data from the APCD to evaluate the pricing power, effi-
ciency, utilization, and quality of the existing provider landscape. Based on its find-
ings, the commission then makes recommendations and supplies data to both the 
state’s attorney general regarding proposed mergers or anticompetitive provider be-
havior and policy-making bodies regarding the need for regulatory intervention.242 
For example, if the commission observes that powerful providers are using anti-
tiering provisions in contracts with health plans to limit the ability of those health 
plans to steer members to lower cost or higher value providers, the commission 
could recommend enforcement action by the state attorney general, or legislation 
prohibiting anti-tiering clauses in provider-plan contracts. A rate oversight 
commission also could be given more direct regulatory authority beyond simply 
monitoring and making recommendations. For example, it might be granted the 
ability to implement price caps if prices rise beyond certain supracompetitive 
thresholds.  
To date, five states have established a rate-oversight commission: Delaware, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, New York, and Pennsylvania.243 Perhaps the most 
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prominent example of such a body is the Massachusetts Health Policy Commission. 
In terms of rate oversight, HPC has some regulatory authority, with the ability to 
require providers that exceed cost growth benchmarks to implement performance 
improvement plans and fine them if the provider fails to comply.244 Along with 
HPC, rate oversight commissions in Delaware, New York, and Pennsylvania have 
authority to analyze price and cost data and make recommendations.245 The 
commission in Maryland, by contrast, has additional authority to approve and set 
inpatient and outpatient rates and limit hospitals’ total revenues.246 In addition, in 
2015 Colorado established a health care cost-containment commission with a three-
year mandate to study the drivers of health care cost growth, analyze the state’s 
APCD and insurance rate review data, and make recommendations to the 
legislature.247  
A significant challenge to the effectiveness of an independent rate oversight 
commission is protecting the body from regulatory capture.248 In particular, it is 
important to insulate the commission from undue influence from health care 
providers and powerful health systems who will resist oversight efforts and 
commission recommendations that scrutinize or threaten their market power and 
pricing practices. The Massachusetts HPC, for example, was structured to avoid 
capture by requiring diverse representation, including those with experience as a 
health administrator, a health economist, a physician, and a representative from a 
variety of perspectives including consumer advocates, health insurance, health care 
workforce, and labor unions, among others.249 In addition, the members of the HPC 
may not be employed as a state executive branch official and may not be employed 
by, affiliated with, serve as a board member, or have a financial stake in any health 
care provider.250  
Another challenge is making sure the rate oversight commission coordinates 
with other existing government agencies and does not just add another regulatory 
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body to the mix.251 To be effective, a commission must closely communicate with 
the APCD authority, the state attorney general, the department of insurance, 
certificate-of-need authorities, and others. Although it can be extremely valuable 
for a state to have an expert, independent commission to analyze APCD data and 
make policy or enforcement recommendations, the most effective model of rate 
oversight commission must be vested with meaningful regulatory and enforcement 
authority—whether it is the power to approve provider budgets, impose limits on 
excessive prices or price increases, or engage in rate regulation.  
2. Insurance Rate Review 
States could also increase the insurance rate review authority of the department 
of insurance. The ACA requires states to review proposed insurance rates for non-
grandfathered health plans and determine the reasonableness of any proposed rate 
increase of more than 10%, but it does not require states to give prior-approval (or 
disapproval) authority over such rate hikes to the department of insurance.252 Pursu-
ant to these requirements, many states strengthened their insurance rate review 
functions. States with prior-approval authority require health insurers to submit 
their rates to the department of insurance for prior approval, and the insurance 
commissioner has the authority to reject or reduce proposed rate increases.253 Other 
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the legislature); NASI PANEL ON PRICING POWER, supra note 26, at 42.  
 252. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg–94(c) (2012); 45 C.F.R. § 154.200 (2015). If the state does not 
establish an effective rate review authority, the Department of Health and Human Services 
shall determine the reasonableness of the proposed rate increase above 10%, but it does not 
have the authority to disapprove the rate. For more on the ACA’s insurance rate review re-
quirements and state rate review activities, see generally John Aloysius Cogan Jr., Health 
Insurance Rate Review, 88 TEMPLE L. REV. 411 (2016).  
 253. “Prior approval” authority generally means that the state insurance commissioner 
can approve, reject, or reduce proposed rate increases from insurers. If a rate is not 
disapproved or reduced by a deadline, it goes into effect. COMMUNITY CATALYST, RATE 
REVIEW: WHAT IS IT AND WHY DOES IT MATTER? 2 (2013), 
http://www.communitycatalyst.org/resources 
/publications/body/Rate-review-fact-sheet-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/7E8G-CE4G]. The 
following states vest the insurance commissioner with prior approval authority: Alabama, 
ALA. CODE § 27-2-17 (LexisNexis 2014); Alaska, ALASKA STAT. § 21.51.405 (2014); 
Arkansas, ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-79-109 (Supp. 2015); Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§10-16-107 (West Supp. 2015); Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 9902–9903 (Supp. 
2014); Hawaii, HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431:14G-105 (West Supp. 2016); Indiana. IND. 
CODE § 27-8-4-7 (2012); Iowa, IOWA CODE ANN. § 514A.13 (West 2015); Kansas, KAN. 
STAT. ANN. § 40-2215 (Supp. 2015); Kentucky, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.17-380 
(LexisNexis 2011)), Maryland, MD. CODE ANN. HEALTH–GEN. § 19-108 (LexisNexis 2015); 
Massachusetts, MASS GEN. LAWS ch. 6D § 2 (West 2016); Michigan, MICH. COMP. LAWS 
ANN. § 550.1607 (West Supp. 2016); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN § 62A.02 (West Supp. 
2016); Mississippi, MISS. CODE ANN. § 83–9–3 (West Supp. 2015); Nebraska, NEB. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 44-710 (LexisNexis Supp. 2015); Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 686B.070 
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states give the insurance commissioner weaker “file-and-use” authority, where rates 
go into effect once they have been filed and the department has no ability to reject 
the rate increase.254 States also vary in terms of which types of health insurance 
products (e.g., individual, group, HMOs, PPOs) are subject to their rate-review 
requirements.255 Recent research suggests states with stronger forms of rate review 
authority, such as prior-approval authority and loss-ratio requirements, experienced 
lower premium increases in the individual market than states without rate review 
authority or with only file-and-use authority.256  
Although insurance rate review focuses on premium rate increases rather than 
on provider prices, limiting the ability of insurance companies to raise premiums 
puts pressure on providers negotiating with the health plans.257 When health plans 
are limited in their ability to raise premiums, they cannot simply pass high provider 
prices on to the policy holders. But most state insurance rate review systems, even 
as augmented by ACA requirements, are generally inadequate to offset some insur-
ers’ lack of bargaining power relative to powerful providers. 
To really get at provider pricing power, insurance rate review must be further 
                                                                                                                 
(LexisNexis 2014); New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 415:1 (2015); New Mexico, 
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-18-13.2 (West Supp. 2015); New York, N.Y. INS. LAW § 213 
(McKinney 2015); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 58-51-95 (West Supp. 2015); 
North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-17-26 (2010); Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
3923.021 (LexisNexis 2010); Oklahoma, OKL. STAT. ANN. tit. 36 § 2606 (West 2011); 
Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. § 743.018 (2015); Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-26-102 (Supp. 
2015); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8 § 4062 (2015); and West Virginia, W. VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 16-29B-1 (LexisNexis Supp. 2016).  
 254. “File-and-use” authority generally means that the insurance companies must file 
their proposed rates with the department of insurance, but the rates may go into effect 
without department approval. The department may have the ability to go back and 
disapprove a rate increase that was later deemed unreasonable, usually triggered by a 
consumer complaint process. COMMUNITY CATALYST, supra note 253, at 2. The following 
states vest the insurance commissioner with file-and-use authority: Arizona, ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 20-1342.02 (2010); Illinois, 235 ILL. COMP. STAT ANN. 93/25 (West 2008); 
Louisiana, LA. STAT. ANN. § 22:972 (2009); Missouri, MO. ANN. STAT. § 354.152 (West 
2015); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-22-156 (2015); New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 
17B:18-5 (West 2013); South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-71-310 (2015); Texas, TEX. 
INS. CODE ANN. § 1507.008 (West 2009); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-602 (LexisNexis 
2014); and Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-316.1 (2015).  
 255. The following states vest prior approval authority in the insurance commissioner 
only for subsets of the insurance market: Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-638 
(West 2011); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.410 (West 2016); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 
33-21-13 (2014); Idaho, IDAHO CODE § 41-5206 (2010); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-
A, § 2736 (2015); Pennsylvania, 35 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 449.17b (West Supp. 
2016); Rhode Island, 4D R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-18-54 (2008); South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS § 58-17-4.1 (2004); Washington, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 48.44.020 (West 2014); 
Wisconsin, WIS. STAT. ANN. § 625.11 (West 2006); and Wyoming, WYO. STAT. ANN. § 26-
18-135 (2015). 
 256. Pinar Karaca-Mandic, Brent D. Fulton, Ann Hollingshead & Richard M. Schaffer, 
States with Stronger Health Insurance Rate Review Authority Experienced Lower Premiums 
in the Individual Market, 34 HEALTH AFF. 1358, 1360 (2015).  
 257. See NASI PANEL ON PRICING POWER, supra note 26, at 44. 
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strengthened by giving the insurance commissioner authority to condition approval 
of insurance rates on mandatory limits on provider price increases. For instance, 
Rhode Island has expanded its insurance department’s authority to limit annual 
price increases for inpatient and outpatient services.258 The state caps the amount of 
price increases to which insurers can contractually agree to the Consumer Price 
Index-Urban plus 1%.259 Rhode Island’s cap on the rate increases insurance plans 
may accept from providers is a form of indirect provider rate caps via health 
insurance rate review.  
The advantages of strengthening insurance rate review authority are that 
stronger forms of insurance rate review may be effective at constraining premium 
growth, which may be especially important as the insurance market becomes more 
concentrated.260 A significant advantage is that insurance rate review builds on a 
state’s existing institutions and infrastructure. In addition, even in states without an 
APCD, the insurance commissioner has extensive authority to gather private price 
and claims data from payers in the state. To be effective, however, most states 
would have to augment the authority of the insurance commissioner, as Rhode 
Island did, to explicitly place limits on provider price increases as part of its 
insurance rate review authority.261 
Without the authority to impose limits on provider prices, a major limitation of 
most states’ insurance rate review system is that the standards for reviewing rate 
increases are not calibrated to address providers’ pricing power but rather get at an-
tiquated property-casualty insurance market problems, such as financial 
solvency.262 Another challenge of insurance rate review is the scope of most states’ 
                                                                                                                 
 
 258. 6C R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-14.5-3 (Supp. 2015); CODE R.I. REG. 4424 (2012). 
 259. See R.I. Office of the Health Ins. Comm., Reg. 17, Sec. 7.e (setting affordability 
standards that include limits on hospital rate increases as a condition of health insurance rate 
approval), http://www.ohic.ri.gov/documents/Regulation-17-Filing-of-Forms-and-Rates.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/29UW-RUBH]. The rules limit hospital price increases to the CPI-Urban 
less Food and Energy for the Northeast Region (CPI-U) plus 1%, decreasing to CPI-U plus 
0% by 2018. See Cogan, supra note 252, at 463 n.297. 
 260. Karaca-Mandic et al., supra note 256, at 1365; Healthy Competition? An 
Examination of the Proposed Health Insurance Mergers and the Consequent Impact on 
Competition: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Regulatory Reform, Commercial and 
Antitrust Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. (2015), 
https://judiciary.house.gov/wp-content 
/uploads/2016/02/114-47_96274.pdf [https://perma.cc/ASS3-W8AW] (written statement of 
Jaime S. King, Professor of Law at the University of California, Hastings College of Law). 
 261. See supra notes 258–259 and accompanying text. 
 262. John Cogan delves extensively into the post-ACA insurance rate review system and 
concludes:  
Since the states, and now the federal government, apply to health insurance a rate 
review standard designed to address a set of market failures that existed a hundred 
years ago for a different insurance product, the health insurance rate review 
process is simply incapable of controlling the fundamental problems that plague 
today’s health insurance market—the market failures leading to excessive provider 
prices. As such, rate review can do little to control the medical cost component of 
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laws and the ACA are too limited and may not apply to all health insurance 
products by excluding, for example, for-profit, employer-based, or large-group 
plans.263 In addition, it is unclear how existing rate review authority will apply to 
provider-risk-bearing organizations, such as ACOs or conglomerates consisting of 
health systems with a health plan. Another risk is that stronger limits on insurers’ 
premium revenue without addressing provider pricing power may drive insurers to 
fold or exit the market. Finally, to the extent insurance rate caps or targets are based 
on averages, they may widen the gap between the “must-have” and “have-not” 
providers.264 Must-have health systems may still command monopoly prices, but to 
get under the cap, the insurers may force less powerful providers to lower prices 
below sustainable levels or exit the market.  
In sum, the existing rate review authority in most states will not likely provide 
sufficient levers to oversee and contain the pricing power of integrated providers. 
However, states can follow Rhode Island’s example and build on the existing 
infrastructure and expertise of the insurance department to provide insurance 
commissioners regulatory authority over private provider rate increases.  
E. Private Rate Caps 
As an intermediate step before full-fledged rate regulation and in conjunction 
with the establishment of a rate oversight authority, a state could cap providers’ 
private health care prices. The cap would apply to all private payers, including out-
of-network payments and self-pay patients.265 In many proposals, price caps are set 
as a percentage of Medicare rates. For example, health economics and policy 
experts from Dartmouth suggested a private price cap of 125% of Medicare 
rates;266 Robert Murray, former executive director of Maryland’s rate setting 
                                                                                                                 
health insurance rates. Simply put, there is a mismatch: health insurance rate 
review uses the wrong tools for the job at hand. 
Cogan, supra note 252, at 415 (emphasis in original). 
 263. See id. at 469. 
 264. See NASI PANEL ON PRICING POWER, supra note 26, at 44. 
 265. Mark Hall & Carl Schneider, Price-Gouging by Doctors and Hospitals, HEALTH 
REFORM WATCH (July 19, 2009), https://web.archive.org/web/20091211202230/http:// 
www.healthreformwatch.com/2009/07/19/price-gouging-by-doctors-and-hospitals/ [https:// 
perma.cc/N2HR-B6HE] (suggesting a price cap of 150% of Medicare prices for self-pay 
patients).  
 266. Jonathan Skinner, Elliot Fisher & James Weinstein, The 125 Percent Solution: 
Fixing Variations in Health Care Prices, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Aug. 26, 2014), 
http://healthaffairs.org 
/blog/2014/08/26/the-125-percent-solution-fixing-variations-in-health-care-prices/ [https://perma.cc 
/6ZU5-9433] (“If every patient and every insurance company always had the option of 
paying 125 percent of the Medicare price for any service, we would effectively cap the worst 
of the price spikes. No longer would the tourist checked out at the ER for heat stroke be 
clobbered with a sky-high bill. Nor would the uninsured single mother be charged 10 times 
the best price for her child’s asthma care. This is not just another government regulation, but 
instead a protection plan that shields consumers from excessive market power.”). 
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agency, suggested a cap of 150–175% of Medicare rates.267 Recent analysis 
demonstrating that private inpatient payments are, on average, 175% of Medicare 
payments may suggest that maximum price cap levels may need to be even 
higher.268 Alternatively, price caps could be defined not by reference to Medicare 
rates but in terms of average or percentages of private prices. Such a price cap 
would require access to private price data from an APCD or other database.269 
Rate caps offer several advantages. First, they can limit outlier prices at the top 
end of the scale, while still allowing for some competition below the cap.270 Rate 
caps preserve the ability of providers to charge different prices from each other, 
which allows providers to compete within this range on the basis of price or 
quality, but the caps limit the extent of price variation by imposing a ceiling on 
prices.271 Second, a broad cap on private payer rates would improve payers’ 
bargaining position to resist price increases by powerful providers or at least put a 
regulatory backstop on the degree to which such providers can charge monopoly 
prices. Third, rate caps are simpler from a regulatory perspective than rate setting, 
where the administrative body has to set prices for each service, because rate caps 
piggyback on the prices set in the Medicare system. 272 
                                                                                                                 
 
 267. See Robert Murray, The Case for a Coordinated System of Provider Payments in the 
United States, 37 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 679, 689 (2012) [hereinafter Murray, The Case 
for a Coordinated System of Provider Payments]; Robert Murray, Health Servs. Cost Review 
Comm’n, The Cost of Hospital Care: Experience from Maryland’s All-Payer Rate Setting 
System, NAT’L HEALTH POL’Y F., at slide 21 (Oct. 8, 2010), http://www.hscrc.state.md.us 
/documents/pdr/Presentations/TheCostofHospitalCareNHPFR_Murray2010-10-08.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/U25A-RRJ2]. 
 268. Thomas M. Selden, Zeynal Karaca, Patricia Keenan, Chapin White & Richard 
Kronick, The Growing Difference Between Public and Private Payment Rates for Inpatient 
Hospital Care, 34 HEALTH AFF. 2147, 2148–49 (2015) (finding that the differential between 
average private rates have grown to 75% higher than Medicare rates in 2012, up from about 
10% higher than Medicare in the period 1996–2001).  
 269. See, e.g., Robin Gelburd, The Need for a Comprehensive, Current, and Market-
Representative Health Care Cost Benchmark, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Oct. 7, 2014), 
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2014/10/07/the-need-for-a-comprehensive-current-and-market-
representative-health-care-cost-benchmark/ [https://perma.cc/2PR6-AVNB ] (proposing to 
set a provider’s “usual, customary, and reasonable” (UCR) rates, used in fee disputes for out-
of-network and self-pay patients, to 80% of average charges drawn from a geographically 
representative dataset of private prices, here, FairHealth.org); David Seltz, David Auerbach, 
Kate Mills, Marian Wrobel & Aaron Pervin, Addressing Price Variation in Massachusetts, 
HEALTH AFF. BLOG (May 12, 2016), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2016/05/12/addressing-price-
variation 
-in-massachusetts/ [https://perma.cc/QKG9-ZQ6J]. 
 270. NASI PANEL ON PRICING POWER, supra note 26, at 46. 
 271. Erin C. Fuse Brown, Resurrecting Health Care Rate Regulation, 67 HASTINGS 
L.J. 85, 133 (2015).  
 272. Robert A. Berenson, Jonathan H. Sunshine, David Helms & Emily Lawton, Why 
Medicare Advantage Plans Pay Hospitals Traditional Medicare Prices, 34 HEALTH AFF. 
1289, 1295 (2015) (“Placing an upper limit on what a hospital or physician can charge as a 
percentage above Medicare prices might provide a regulatory alternative to actually setting 
the commercial rates themselves, likely a less intrusive and less resource-intensive endeavor, 
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On the other hand, to the extent that rate caps piggyback on Medicare rates, they 
incorporate all the flaws of the Medicare pricing system as well as its strengths.273 
Rate caps also do not eliminate inefficiencies and administrative costs of price dis-
crimination by providers, the practice of charging different rates to different payers 
for the same service.274 Rate caps should only be considered for noncompetitive 
markets, because any rate-cap level, even if supported by substantial expertise and 
data, will not precisely replicate the maximum prices that would result in a 
competitive market in equilibrium. Some have criticized rate caps and other forms 
of rate regulation as potentially stifling financial incentives for innovation.275 Rate 
caps are politically challenging as well; they are likely to be opposed by the most 
powerful providers whose pricing power will be limited by the caps. Caps may be 
supported, however, by health plans, employers, and other purchasers of health care 
because they could constrain the cost of including must-have providers in health 
plan networks.  
To date, no state has implemented price caps, although Rhode Island’s insurance 
rate caps276 and West Virginia’s now-defunct hospital rate review program277 
resemble the price caps described here.278  
Price caps are often viewed as an intermediate, less intrusive alternative to rate-
setting to limit unwarranted price variation especially among dominant providers. 
Nevertheless, some administrative infrastructure must be established to determine 
whether to implement a price cap or how to set the cap. States will require data 
from an APCD and perhaps a rate oversight commission with expertise to come up 
                                                                                                                 
especially if the out-of-network ceilings were set initially to affect only a small number of 
especially high-price hospitals.”). 
 273. Gelburd, supra note 269 (critiquing a system of price caps based on Medicare prices 
because Medicare may not be representative of costs or particular dynamics in certain 
markets, such as for lower-volume providers).  
 274. Uwe E. Reinhardt, The Many Different Prices Paid to Providers and the Flawed 
Theory of Cost Shifting: Is It Time for a More Rational All-Payer System?, 30 HEALTH AFF. 
2125, 2128–29 (2011). 
 275. See, e.g., Michael A. Morrisey, Frank A. Sloan & Samuel A. Mitchell, State Rate 
Setting: An Analysis of Some Unresolved Issues, 2 HEALTH AFF. 36, 36 (1983) (noting that 
detractors of state rate setting say that rate setting stifles innovation).  
 276. See supra text accompanying notes 258–259. 
 277. See supra text accompanying note 290–292. 
 278. In an effort to address persistent provider price variation in Massachusetts, a SEIU-
led ballot initiative in 2015–2016 proposed to limit providers’ private rates to a corridor 20% 
above or 10% below the average price paid to all providers by that health plan for that 
service. Massachusetts Fair Health Care Pricing Act, No. 15-19 (2015–2016 Mass. Ballot 
Initiatives), http://www.mass.gov/ago/docs/government/2015-petitions/15-19.pdf 
[https://perma.cc 
/3CZ6-8D3Q]. The SEIU agreed to drop the ballot measure when the Massachusetts 
legislature passed a compromise to create a fund to redistribute funds from higher- to lower-
priced hospitals and with the promise of more union jobs at the largest hospital system. 
Priyanka Dayal McCluskey & Jim O’Sullivan, Deal Reached To Avert Ballot Question on 
Hospitals, BOS. GLOBE (May 25, 2016), https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2016/05/25 
/deal-reached-avert-ballot-question-hospitals/xDPLHx13YRUq89Qz8FMCXK/story.html [https://perma 
.cc/TZ8C-TG7K]. 
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with the price cap levels and methodology.  
F. Provider Rate Regulation 
In highly concentrated provider markets where provider conglomerates are exer-
cising unchecked market power, states can address provider pricing power through 
direct regulation of provider prices. Different versions of rate regulation are dis-
cussed below: all-payer rate setting exemplified by Maryland’s system; private rate 
regulation as illustrated by West Virginia’s now-defunct rate-review authority; and 
the move to incorporate rate setting into global budget initiatives. 
1. All-Payer Rate Setting 
The prototypical system of provider rate regulation is all-payer rate setting, 
which would set the rate for all payers, whether private insurers, government 
programs, or self-pay patients. To include Medicare in the all-payer model, the 
state must obtain a waiver from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services.279 
Under an all-payer system, either a rate setting commission or a representative 
body of payers negotiates a uniform set of provider reimbursement rates.280 
Although traditionally applied to hospital services, in its broadest form, rate setting 
could apply to all provider services (whether hospital, physician, post-acute, lab, 
diagnostic, etc.).  
Under the rate setting commission approach, the commission collects detailed 
information about costs, patient volumes, hospital finances, and services for each 
provider for use in rate setting.281 The best-known and only example of this public 
utility model of rate setting is Maryland’s all-payer rate setting system, where an 
administrative body sets hospital rates.282 Maryland’s system has controlled 
hospital costs-per-case, but it must be paired with global budgets or ACO-type 
mechanisms to limit incentives to increase patient volume. In the 1970s, several 
states adopted rate setting systems only to abandon them during the deregulatory 
era of the 1980s–90s when managed care seemed to be constraining health care 
                                                                                                                 
 
 279. See Robert Murray, Setting Hospital Rates To Control Costs and Boost Quality: The 
Maryland Experience, 28 HEALTH AFF. 1395, 1395–96 (2009).  
 280. See Vladeck & Rice, supra note 13, at 1312–13. 
 281. Murray, The Case for a Coordinated System of Provider Payments, supra note 267, 
at 686–88. The data collection and analysis is similar to that performed through an APCD 
and could also be used for rate setting. 
 282. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 19-201 to 19-203 (LexisNexis 2015) (establishing 
the Maryland Health Services Cost Review Commission (HSCRC)); §§ 19-219 to 19-221 
(providing for the HSCRC’s authority to review and set hospital rates); MD. CODE ANN., INS. 
§ 15-604 (requiring all payers to reimburse Maryland hospitals based on the rates established 
by the HSCRC); MD. CODE REGS. 10.37.01–.37.12 (2016) (setting forth administrative rules 
for hospital rate review and rate setting in Maryland); see also Murray, The Case for a 
Coordinated System of Provider Payments, supra note 267, at 686.  
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costs.283 
For the second model of rate setting through collective negotiation, there are no 
examples from the United States, but Japan, Germany, France, Switzerland, and 
other OECD countries use this model.284 This model combines the bargaining 
leverage of all payers together in an oligopsony.285 To counteract provider pricing 
power, insurers combine their bargaining power and collectively negotiate with 
each provider separately or with a consortium representing all providers.286 For 
those concerned about concentration among health insurers, allowing payers to 
come together to bargain collectively with providers is not the same as increasing 
concentration in the insurance market. The individual health plans would still have 
to compete for their own customers on the basis of premiums, provider networks, 
consumer experience, and other benefits.287  
Although rate setting eliminates price discrimination by a single provider 
against its various payers, rate setting generally allows providers to charge different 
prices from each other, which preserves some degree of competition. Competition 
can be amplified by reporting providers’ percentage markup above the standard rate 
and quality ratings to allow price and quality comparisons with other providers.288 
Somewhat like Medicare, this approach allows for price differences to reflect 
differences in costs if, for example, the facility is a teaching hospital.289 To the 
extent it encourages price and quality transparency, rate setting could also 
encourage competition among providers on the basis of value, while still limiting 
the pricing power of dominant providers.  
2. Private Rate Regulation 
Until recently, West Virginia provided a different model of provider rate regula-
                                                                                                                 
 
 283. John E. McDonough, Tracking the Demise of State Hospital Rate Setting, 16 
HEALTH AFF. 142, 145 (1997).  
 284. See Uwe E. Reinhardt, A Modest Proposal on Payment Reform, HEALTH AFF. BLOG 
(July 24, 2009), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2009/07/24/a-modest-proposal-on-payment-reform/ 
[https://perma.cc/YK3S-DXJV]; Reinhardt, supra note 274, at 2129; Vladeck & Rice, supra 
note 13, at 1313. 
 285. Vladeck & Rice, supra note 13, at 1313.  
 286. See Austin Frakt, All-Payer Rate Setting and Health Reform’s Underpants Gnomes 
Strategy, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (June 2, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs 
/wonkblog/post/all-payer-rate-setting-and-health-reforms-underpants-gnomes-strategy/2011 
/06/02/AG3SfHHH_blog.html#pagebreak [https://perma.cc/FP6X-2KD3]. 
 287. See id. 
 288. See Murray, The Case for a Coordinated System of Provider Payments, supra note 
267, at 683–84; Reinhardt, supra note 284; Uwe E. Reinhardt, The Pricing of U.S. Hospital 
Services: Chaos Behind the Veil of Secrecy, 25 HEALTH AFF. 57, 65–66 (2006); Austin Frakt, 
Simply Put: All-Payer Rate Setting, INCIDENTAL ECONOMIST BLOG (Apr. 8, 2011), http:// 
theincidentaleconomist.com/wordpress/simply-put-all-payer-rate-setting/ [https://perma.cc 
/7CAW-X5EQ]. 
 289. See Frakt, supra note 288; Reinhardt, supra note 284.  
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tion through review of providers’ private prices.290 West Virginia established its 
Health Care Authority in 1983 to gather information on health care costs and run 
the state’s rate regulation and certificate of need programs to control health care 
costs and capital expenditures.291 In 2016, West Virginia abolished the agency’s 
hospital rate review authority,292 but we describe its system here as an example of a 
state program to regulate private prices.  
Under the prior system, West Virginia hospitals would submit a rate application 
to the Authority with their proposed private rates and their cost information, and 
the Health Care Authority could approve, disapprove, or seek modification of the 
hospital’s rates for private payers.293 West Virginia’s hospital rate review system 
excluded Medicare rates (which would require a Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS) waiver) as well Medicaid and public employees’ 
insurance rates.294 A hospital could accept a guaranteed or pre-approved rate 
increase by tying its proposed increase to a benchmarking methodology, based on 
peer hospitals’ costs and charges, or it could apply for a greater rate increase 
subject to more in-depth review.295 Rather than setting rates precisely for each 
hospital, West Virginia’s system effectively created a rate corridor with the 
authority-approved charge limit serving as the ceiling on its privately negotiated 
prices and the hospital’s costs serving as the floor.296 Under this system, hospitals 
could negotiate different prices and payment methodologies with different payers, 
preserving a degree of price variation and discrimination.  
Under its private rate review system, West Virginia’s costs-per-case grew 
slower than the national average, suggesting that it was somewhat effective at 
controlling health care price growth.297 However, West Virginia’s inpatient and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 290. West Virginia’s was not an all-payer system, because it did not include Medicare 
and Medicaid in its rate-setting authority. 
 291. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-29b-1 to -29 (West 1997 & Supp. 2016) (§ 16-29b-19 to -
21a repealed 2016); W. VA. CODE R. § 65-5-1 to -28 (1992). 
 292. S.B. 68, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2016) (enacted) (amending the powers 
granted to the Health Care Authority in West Virginia). 
 293. W.VA. CODE ANN. § 16-29b-19 (repealed 2016). 
 294. ROBERT MURRAY & ROBERT A. BERENSON, HOSPITAL RATE SETTING REVISITED: 
DUMB PRICE FIXING OR A SMART SOLUTION TO PROVIDER PRICING POWER AND DELIVERY 
REFORM? 31 (2015), http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-
pdfs/2000516-Hospital-Rate-Setting-Revisited.pdf [https://perma.cc/9YEY-AM8K].  
 295. See ANNA S. SOMMERS, CHAPIN WHITE & PAUL B. GINSBURG, ADDRESSING 
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outpatient utilization rates were much higher than the national average, which 
drove the state’s relatively high per capita hospital spending.298 In any event, 
without rate review authority and with new laws shielding hospital mergers and 
conduct from state and federal antitrust liability,299 West Virginia has moved 
rapidly to remove oversight of hospital pricing or competition.  
3. Global Budgets 
Newer rate setting approaches are moving to incorporate global budgets to 
simultaneously regulate prices and utilization for providers by imposing total 
revenue limits on health systems.300 States can prospectively set a global budget for 
an integrated health system to cover the total expected health care costs of a defined 
population for a given time period.301 A health system that exceeds its global 
budget must make up for the excess spending in the following year’s budget, but if 
its expenditures come in under budget, the health system keeps the surplus.  
CMS has modified Maryland’s rate setting waiver to require implementation of 
global budgets.302 Other states could similarly establish regulatory limits on 
hospital budgets without first implementing stand-alone rate setting. Controlling a 
provider’s total revenues simultaneously constrains both prices and utilization 
because the provider’s revenues are the result of a combination of its prices, 
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utilization, and operating costs. A global budget approach tied to population health 
spending may be more efficient than stand-alone hospital rate setting because 
providers cannot simply increase utilization to make up for constrained prices, 
increase prices to compensate for constrained utilization, or cost shift between 
inpatient and outpatient settings. 
Vermont passed legislation in 2012 to constrain total health care spending 
through administrative review of hospital budgets.303 Hospitals are required to 
submit their proposed annual budget to the state’s Green Mountain Care Board for 
review and approval.304 The Board may require a hospital to adjust its budget with 
changes to its rates or net revenues,305 and hospital compliance with the budget is 
enforceable through court-ordered injunction or civil administrative penalties.306 
Vermont is moving toward a global budget system, which would allow the Board 
to set payments rates and total revenues for hospitals from all payers to manage all 
of the health care for a given population.307 Under the global budget system, the 
Board would set a uniform rate increase for each hospital applicable to all payers, 
eliminating the hospital’s separate rate negotiation with each commercial payer.308 
In late 2016, CMS and Vermont agreed to implement an all-payer model, which 
aligns payment rates for Medicare, Medicaid, and commercial payers under an all-
payer accountable care organization.309 Under the all-payer model, which not only 
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applies to hospital services but also includes physician and other ancillary 
providers, Vermont will limit statewide per-capita health spending growth to 3.5% 
annually and move away from a fee-for-service payment model to payments that 
are adjusted for population health outcomes and quality of care targets.310 
Initial results from Maryland and Vermont’s efforts at hospital budget oversight 
are promising. During the first year with global budgets, Maryland limited per 
capita hospital cost growth to 1.47%—well under the target of 3.58% annual 
growth—and saved Medicare $116 million.311 Vermont’s hospitals have been 
limited to modest budget increases, but they simultaneously increased their 
profitability.312 Global budget models are promising because they go beyond rate 
setting models that focus only on prices to incorporate mechanisms to oversee all 
the components of total health care spending: prices, utilization, and hospital 
operating costs. 
The primary advantage of all forms of provider rate regulation is that these ap-
proaches directly counteract providers’ pricing power in noncompetitive markets. 
Rate regulation does this either through administrative rate setting as is done by 
public utilities and in the Medicare program or by combining the bargaining power 
of all purchasers and payers. Rate regulation also has the potential to dramatically 
reduce administrative costs for providers. By eliminating price discrimination 
among payers, providers could reduce the administrative costs of negotiating 
different rates and maintaining separate billing procedures for each payer. These 
administrative costs are significant drivers of health care costs as the United States’ 
fragmented payer landscape explains much of why providers’ administrative costs 
are so much higher in the United States than in other countries with similarly 
developed health systems.313 To maximize transparency and administrative ease, 
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the rate schedule could be based on Medicare rates, and to the extent that Medicare 
is not included in the payment system, the rate setting entity could express private 
rates as a simple multiplier of Medicare rate. 
Rate setting could allow prices to vary between providers, but the variation in 
price would reflect differences in quality rather than market power as it does 
now.314 Thus, under a rate-setting regime, you could still have an element of 
competition between providers on the basis of value and quality or services offered.  
One of the biggest challenges of rate setting is political. The major hospital sys-
tems whose prices would be constrained the most are often extremely powerful 
entities, the engines of local economies and jobs. A lesson from the many states 
that implemented and later abandoned rate setting in the 1980s is that the rate-
setting agency must be structured to avoid regulatory failure from bureaucratic 
complexity and regulatory capture.315 Regulatory complexity and inflexibility can 
be avoided by using standard payment formulas rather than individual budget 
review.316 A global budget approach may also get regulators out of the difficult 
business of setting specific rates for each item and service and instead let them 
focus on total hospital budgets, which may be more flexible and less complex. 
Ensuring the independence of the rate setting authority from excessive industry or 
political influence is essential to avoiding regulatory capture. Agency independence 
can be protected by prohibiting commissioners from having affiliations with 
regulated providers317 and implementing accountability measures, such as federal 
oversight under a Medicare waiver, to counteract local political pressure to loosen 
standards or make special exceptions.318 
 Another significant challenge with rate setting is that it only addresses the price 
half of the cost-control equation.319 Rate regulation must be paired with global 
budgets, volume adjustments, or other population-based payments to control the 
tendency to increase utilization. Both Maryland and West Virginia demonstrated 
that rate setting can control costs-per-case quite effectively, but not volume. 
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Maryland’s 2014 Medicare waiver adds global budgets to its rate-setting program, 
which is no easy feat, but it is a necessary adjustment to control both the price and 
utilization components of health care spending. Vermont’s all-payer model builds 
on an ACO design, in which the ACO will receive a population-based payment for 
every person attributed to it, whether a Medicare beneficiary or privately insured 
patient.320 
In sum, in states where competition is no longer functioning to keep provider 
prices in check, rate regulation may be the preferred strategy, or the last best hope 
for counteracting the price effects of health care integration. To set rates or global 
budgets, provider rate regulation must be built on a foundation of information from 
an APCD or similarly comprehensive and detailed claim data. The ingredient of in-
dependence is necessary to avoid regulatory failure from capture by powerful 
providers.  
CONCLUSION 
Bending the health care cost curve requires constraining both utilization and 
price. Reducing fragmentation in health care can help reduce overutilization by 
offering incentives to promote collaboration and integration. But increased health 
care integration is a double-edged sword. Efforts to integrate health care to achieve 
benefits in terms of quality and reduced utilization can also lead to increased 
market power and prices, which could potentially defeat much or all of the cost 
savings from reduced utilization. 
There are currently few systemic checks on the growing pricing power of inte-
grated health care providers. Federal antitrust and cost-control policies are limited 
in their abilities to control private health care price increases, particularly new 
forms of vertical integration driven by health reforms like ACOs. This creates both 
an opportunity and an obligation for states to address rising prices stemming from 
health care integration and consolidation.  
The way to manage the double-edged sword of health care integration is to en-
courage beneficial integration but pair it with oversight on price and quality. States 
have a menu of policy options, and the particular policy recipe will vary by state, 
but three ingredients are necessary for effective oversight: (1) Information—states 
must have a means to collect and analyze price, quality, utilization, and market 
data, such as an all-payer claims database, in order to determine which policy 
choices to select and to evaluate their success; (2) Independence—state oversight 
bodies must be insulated from the powerful providers they oversee; and (3) 
Regulatory Authority—state oversight bodies must have the authority to enforce or 
impose limits on providers’ prices when they become too high. If we are to control 
our personal and national health care spending, states have a critical role to play in 
overseeing health care integration and private health care price increases. 
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